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ABSTRACT 
Peace enforcement—the threat or use of military force to compel belligerent adherence to a civil 
war settlement—has become increasingly salient in the past decade. Using a hazards analysis of 
all civil wars and associated third party interventions between 1945 and 2013 in addition to three 
structured, focused case studies, I argue that peace enforcement operations that 1) utilize the 
appropriate typological spoiler management strategy and 2) maintain legitimacy and impartiality 
through close cooperation with UN peacekeepers, are the most successful at catalyzing civil war 
termination and securing durable peace. I also provide a theoretical framework through which to 
study peace enforcement operations that builds upon Stephen Stedman and Barbara Walter’s 
conceptualization of spoilers, third party security guarantees, and the strategic alteration of 
belligerent cost-benefit calculus.  
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
 Peace enforcement—the threat or use of military force to compel belligerent 
adherence to a civil war settlement—has become increasingly salient in the past decade. 
Despite a now vast and comprehensive literature on intrastate peacekeeping, few studies 
explore peace enforcement’s efficacy or the underlying causal mechanisms through 
which it impacts belligerent decisions about pursuing peace or returning to war. While 
peace enforcement’s rapid proliferation in recent years is attributable to a variety of 
factors including increased western interest in civil war resolution and counterterrorism, 
the underlying problem remains the same: the international community continues to be 
plagued by seemingly intractable civil wars responsible for killing over 20 million people 
worldwide since 1945, and displacing 67 million more.1 Considering this stark reality, 
what mechanisms does the international community possess to end and prevent intrastate 
conflict? 
 Amidst untenable peace or ongoing civil war, even the most robust, 
multidimensional peacekeeping operations often prove unable to make peace where there 
is no true peace to keep in the first place. Under these circumstances, peace enforcement 
operations must be deployed to make and implement peace, thereby enabling 
peacekeepers to do what they do best: keep a peace that has already been established. 
While intrastate peacekeeping has a strong, causal effect on the duration of peace in the 
                                                          
1
 Nicholas Sambanis and Jennifer Hochschild, Defining Civil War: Using Case Studies to Expand Economic 
Models of Civil War (online; American Political Science Association, 2010), 
https://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/sambanis.pdf (accessed 9 April, 2013). 
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aftermath of civil war2 only peace enforcement missions possess the ‘teeth,’ or mandate 
and means, necessary to make peace. Does peace enforcement work? Is it more effective 
at ending conflict than conventional third party interventions in civil wars? If so, how 
does peace enforcement work? These are the questions that drive and inspire this thesis.  
 Currently, our understanding of peace enforcement suffers from three major gaps: 
we (1) know too little about whether or how much peace enforcement contributes to 
making peace; (2) lack a concrete understanding of the causal mechanisms through which 
it establishes and enforces peace; and (3) know almost nothing about those variables that 
determine operational success or failure. This thesis utilizes quantitative and comparative 
case study methodologies to address these fundamental gaps while examining peace 
enforcement as both a determinant of civil war termination and a settlement 
implementation mechanism capable of resolving cooperation and coordination problems 
that prevent disarmament and stable power sharing in a conflict’s aftermath. I 
demonstrate that under the right circumstances, namely with the appropriate strategic 
approach and UN cooperation, peace enforcement operations can accelerate civil war 
termination and significantly improve the likelihood of successful settlement 
implementation. My overall argument is more nuanced, however, and attempts to explain 
how peace enforcement affects peace.  
 Drawing from Barbara Walter’s theory of civil war resolution and Stephen 
Stedman’s typological theory of spoiler management, I propose a causal theory of peace 
enforcement success. I argue that there are three causal mechanisms through which peace 
enforcement motivates belligerents to (a) genuinely agree to a ceasefire or negotiated 
                                                          
2
 Virginia Fortna Page, Does peacekeeping work?: shaping belligerents' choices after civil war (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2008), 104-125. 
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settlement and (b) demobilize and abide by the terms of that settlement. These 
mechanisms are by (1) counterbalancing belligerent military advantage and raising the 
cost of war and relative benefits of peace; (2) enforcing a settlement’s terms by making 
reneging more costly and providing the security guarantee necessary to prevent 
belligerents from taking advantage of their opponent’s compliance; and (3) establishing 
momentum in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of belligerents 
so that the transition to a follow-on peacekeeping operation can occur seamlessly.  In 
sum, my theory is premised upon a model of interaction between a government and rebel 
group(s) that entails mutual distrust and interrelated commitment problems that prevent 
belligerents from rationally committing to either (a) or (b) as outlined above. 
  Accompanying this theory, I contend that regardless of force capability, peace 
enforcement operations are the most successful when they utilize the appropriate spoiler 
management strategy, and maintain impartiality and legitimacy through close cooperation 
with, and the delegation of sensitive post-conflict tasks to, UN peacekeepers. While 
peace enforcement operations can provide the security guarantee necessary to halt or 
prevent violence, only hyper-neutral UN peacekeepers can effectively facilitate sensitive 
post-conflict tasks such as DDR and state building. In the absence of these operational 
elements and an amenable division of labor between peace enforcers and UN 
peacekeepers, peace enforcement can exacerbate rather than mitigate belligerents’ 
perception that they must fight for ‘all or nothing’ in a conflict. Beyond improving our 
overall understanding of peace enforcement operations and how they might be most 
effective, my purpose here is partly to highlight how little we know about peace 
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enforcement operations and third party intervention in general—and stimulate further 
scholarship and debate on the subject. 
 Due to the small population of modern peace enforcement cases ripe for analysis 
at the time of writing, this thesis cannot provide a definitive causal theory of peace 
enforcement success. While my statistical findings overwhelmingly indicate that peace 
enforcement operations that utilize the appropriate spoiler management strategy and 
cooperate closely with UN peacekeepers significantly increase the likelihood of civil war 
termination, a lack of covariates calls into question some of these results. Additionally, 
my case studies cannot meet the standard set forth by George and Bennett for structured, 
focused comparisons. Consequently, this thesis is intended to serve as a plausibility 
probe, or preliminary study of relatively untested theories and hypotheses to determine 
whether more intensive testing in the future is warranted.3  
 In order to test my theory further and strengthen its explanatory power, I would 
need to supplement this thesis with interviews (with ex-combatants and others to uncover 
their true motives for agreeing to and abiding by a settlement) and cases of peace 
enforcement that better lend themselves to Mill’s methods of agreement and difference. 
Operation Serval in Mali (2012-time of writing) and Operation Linda Nchi (2011-2012), 
for example, would be excellent candidates for a more rigorous structured, focused 
comparison. Despite these insurmountable obstacles, I utilize the structured, focused 
comparison methodology outlined by George and Bennett to test my causal theory of 
success in the most methodologically rigorous manner possible. 
 
                                                          
3
 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the social sciences 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 75. 
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Defining Peace Enforcement 
 Before outlining my research design, it is important to explicitly define ‘peace 
enforcement operations’ and a number of other key terms. Considering the general lack 
of consensus among scholars as to what distinguishes peace enforcement from 
peacekeeping, I have decided to deviate slightly from the academic norm and embrace the 
United States Military’s own broad and inclusive definition of peace enforcement 
operations:  
 
a. Peace enforcement operations (PEO) enforce the provisions of a mandate 
designed to maintain or restore peace and order. PEO may include the 
enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of personnel conducting 
foreign humanitarian assistance missions, restoration of order, and forcible 
separation of belligerent parties. PEO may be conducted pursuant to a lawful 
mandate or in accordance with international law and do not require the consent of 
the host nation or the parties to the conflict, although broad based consent is 
preferred. Forces conducting PEO use force or the threat of force to coerce or 
compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions. In PEO, force is threatened 
against or applied to belligerent parties to terminate fighting, restore order and 
create an environment conducive to resolving the dispute. Although combat may 
be required, PEO are not classified as major operations and normally have more 
restrictive rules of engagement. Forces conducting PEO generally have full 
combat capabilities, although there may be some restrictions on weapons and 
targeting.  
 
b. The impartiality with which the PEO force treats all parties and the nature of its 
objectives separates it from major [traditional military] operations. The purpose of 
PEO is not to destroy or defeat an adversary, but to use force or the threat of force 
to establish a safe and secure environment so that peacebuilding can succeed. The 
term “peace enforcement” is not specifically mentioned in the UN Charter; 
however, the UN Charter’s language allows the UNSC to authorize military 
operations ‘as may be necessary to restore or maintain international peace and 
security.’ PEO are often conducted by lead regional organizations or a coalition of 
states under a lead nation. Since PEO may include offensive and defensive 
operations, missions must be clear and end states defined. In a particular 
operational area, offensive, defensive, and stability operations may occur 
simultaneously.4 
                                                          
4
 JD 3-07.3 Peace Operations, United States Army.  
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This definition suits my purposes in that it outlines the core tenant of peace 
enforcement—the threat or use of coercive force to compel belligerent cooperation—and 
alludes to the predominant role non-UN actors play in executing peace enforcement 
operations.  
 While peacekeeping operations are almost always carried out by the United 
Nations, peace enforcement is 
usually conducted by leading 
regional organizations or a 
coalition of states under a lead 
nation, sometimes alongside UN 
peacekeepers.5 The current 
division of labor ideally entails 
regional organizations and single 
states enforcing peace, and the 
UN conducting follow-on 
peacekeeping operations to 
strengthen peace after 
hostilities have ceased. While peace enforcement operations are not always explicitly 
authorized by a UN Security Council mandate, nearly all enjoy the public support of the 
United Nations Secretary General. The United Kingdom’s enforcement operation in 
Sierra Leone, for example, was never granted an explicit UNSC mandate, but was 
                                                          
5
 JD 3-07.3 Peace Operations, US Army. 
Table 1.1 Consent Versus Force Capability.  
Source: JD 3-07.3, I-3 
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deployed to support the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone at the request of 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan. 
 Because of peace enforcement’s relatively recent proliferation, scholars writing in 
the late 1990s or early 2000s (the vast majority of literature on peace operations) tend to 
erroneously label a number of robust UN peacekeeping missions such as UNOSOM II, 
UNPROFOR, UNTAET, and UNAMSIL as ‘peace enforcement operations.’ As Trevor 
Findlay points out, all of these missions exhibit some characteristics and elements of 
peace enforcement, but lack the credible threat of force that is the cornerstone of true 
peace enforcement operations.6 Table 1.1 nicely illustrate the differences between 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement in terms of both force capability and belligerent 
consent—using UN and NATO missions in Kosovo and Bosnia as examples for context. 
Drawing a clear distinction between contemporary intrastate peace enforcement and 
peacekeeping is essential, and not especially difficult after dismissing earlier UN-led 
‘peace enforcement’ operations such as UNOSOM and UNPROFOR as ‘chapter VI½ 
peacekeeping.’7  
 That being said, not all modern peace enforcement operations are created equal. 
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, for example, has not 
always treated all parties with conditional impartiality as outlined by JD 3-07 above—a 
shortcoming I discuss at length in Chapter 5. While enforcement missions8 often initially 
treat all parties to a dispute with impartiality, it is sometimes necessary for them to 
                                                          
6
 Trevor Findlay, The use of force in UN peace operations (Solna, Sweden: SIPRI, 2002), 6-7.  
7
 UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold originally coined the term ‘chapter VI½ peacekeeping,’ and it 
has since been adopted by policymakers and practitioners to  describe robust peacekeeping operations 
that fall short of the mandate and force capability now expected of true peace enforcement operations 
8
 “Enforcement missions” also embody their own distinct operational category (albeit a seldom used one), 
but for the duration of this thesis, any mention of “enforcement mission(s)” is merely shorthand for 
“peace enforcement operations” 
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compromise this impartiality and conduct operations in support of one particular party 
against another. This is especially true when greedy or total spoilers with immutable 
goals are involved. In most cases, this use of force is only necessary until the 
noncooperative party is defeated or agrees to a settlement. The use of the terms ‘neutral’ 
‘impartial’ throughout this thesis are not intended to mean impartial in the strict sense of 
the term. Rather, they are tied to Stedman’s spoiler management strategy discussed in 
Chapter 2. A peace enforcement operation is considered ‘impartial’ or ‘neutral’ in this 
thesis so long as it is not utilizing an inappropriate spoiler management strategy or, in 
other words, using fore against actors willing to negotiate and agree to a settlement.  
 Traditionally, peace enforcement operations entail two distinct operational stages: 
first, a coercive strategy is employed to force belligerents to abide by a ceasefire or 
otherwise participate in negotiations aimed at resolving the conflict and, second, a 
selectively coercive strategy is employed to provide the security guarantee necessary to 
implement a negotiated settlement or other agreement after hostilities have ceased. 
Peacekeeping missions rely upon impartiality, the limited use of force, and belligerent 
consent for success while peace enforcement does not necessarily require any of these 
elements.9 As first outlined by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali in An Agenda 
for Peace: 
 
In theory, peace enforcement is the creation of peace through the military support 
of one side in a conflict in order to force a victory or stalemate that makes it 
rational for the opposing side to cease fighting militarily and begin negotiating 
diplomatically. Successful peace enforcement creates the conditions for 
peacekeeping. Peacekeepers, on the other hand, are a neutral force sent in to 
maintain a peace that has already been established, tentative though it may be, so 
that the theatre of conflict between warring parties can switch from the battlefield 
                                                          
9
 The origin of the term “peace enforcement” is often traced back to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda 
for Peace (New York: United Nations, 1995) 
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to the boardroom. Successful peacekeeping holds the balance of power on the 
ground constant so that a negotiated political solution can be reached and 
institutionalized, based on that balance.10 
 
Unlike peace enforcement, peacekeeping operations rely upon traditional principles of 
belligerent consent and the strictly defensive use of force to achieve their aims.  
 While some scholars suggest it is possible to distinguish between peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement solely on the basis of whether a mission possesses a Chapter VI 
peacekeeping or Chapter VII enforcement mandate, there are a number of UN-led 
missions with Chapter VII mandates that I would not classify as enforcement operations 
by any stretch of the imagination.11 What scholars now refer to as ‘multidimensional,’ 
‘wider,’ or ‘second generation’ peacekeeping refers to more robust contemporary 
peacekeeping operations that are carried out with belligerent consent, but in an 
environment that may still be volatile.12 These increasingly common missions are large 
and complex, often involving “sizable political, military, police, refugee, humanitarian, 
electoral, and often human rights components.”13 While they may operate alongside 
peace enforcement operations, multidimensional peacekeeping constitutes a distinct 
operational type that has already been studied at length in the existing literature. 
Distinguishing between peace enforcement and third party intervention may appear tricky 
at first glance, but is infinitely more simplified by my classification of only UN-
sanctioned post-1990 military actions as ‘peace enforcement,’ and all other unilateral 
                                                          
10
 Leslie Hough, “A study of peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and private military companies in Sierra 
Leone: features,” African Security Review, 16:4 (2007): 14. 
11
 UN-led ‘peace enforcement’ missions in Somalia and Bosnia, for example, were deployed under a 
Chapter VII mandate, but were in reality what I would consider ‘Chapter VI½’ missions: while they were 
formally authorized to use force beyond strict self-defense, they lacked the means and political will to 
even attempt to deliver upon these mandates. Since the Brahimi Report, a number of multidimensional 
UN peacekeeping missions have been deployed under a chapter VII mandate, but in practice are only 
realistically able to use force in self-defense.  
12
 HMSO, Wider Peacekeeping (London: Ministry of Defence, 1995). 
13
 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?, 1. 
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military action ‘third party intervention.’ Other common types of peace support 
operations include peace building, which encompasses stability actions, predominantly 
diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild government infrastructure and 
institutions to avoid a relapse into conflict; peacemaking, the process of diplomacy, 
mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a 
dispute and resolves issues that led to it; and conflict prevention, a peace operation 
employing complementary diplomatic, civil , and military means to monitor and identify 
the causes of a conflict and take timely action to prevent occurrence, escalation, or the 
resumption of hostilities.14  
 While there are no recent UN operations15 that meet the qualifications necessary 
to be classified as peace enforcement operations, there are several that come close. The 
UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO, previously MONUC), 
for example, comes closest—authorized under a Chapter VII mandate and occasionally 
fighting alongside the Congolese government—but has more often than not refused to 
fight in the face of rebel advances. In Cote D’Ivoire, UN peacekeepers deployed under 
ONUCI fought alongside French peace enforcement forces in the 2011 Second Ivorian 
Civil War, but likely would not have done so on their own accord. Much of this thesis is 
concerned with highlighting the optimal effectiveness of an amenable division of labor 
between the UN and other non-UN actors while simultaneously exploring variables that 
are determinant of mission success and failure. 
 After outlining my research design below, I devote the remainder of Chapter I to a 
discussion of peace enforcement’s historical and normative evolution.  
                                                          
14
 JD 3-07.3 Peace Operations, I-8. 
15
 Except possibly ONUC 
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Research Design  
 This thesis employs both quantitative and qualitative methods to improve our 
overall understanding of peace enforcement operations. Before testing my causal theory 
in three carefully selected case studies, I analyze contemporary peace enforcement’s 
impact on civil war termination and compare its affect to third party interventions more 
generally. My quantitative analysis of a dataset encompassing all intrastate conflicts and 
associated third party interventions between 1945 and March 2013 provides breadth, 
while my structured, focused comparisons seek to compensate for the depth that is lost 
when conflicts and battle deaths are reduced to mere numbers in a statistical model. 
 
Quantitative Analysis 
 In Chapter III, I test whether modern peace enforcement operations have an 
impact on civil war termination. By employing duration models (also known as hazards, 
or survival models) to explore the affect peace enforcement operations have on the length 
of civil war, I am able to measure their impact on civil war termination relative to third 
party interventions more generally. In my duration models, I use Cox proportional 
hazards models (henceforth Cox PH models) that make no assumptions about the 
underlying “hazard function” of civil war termination, or whether conflicts become more 
or less likely to last given that they have held thus far, and whether this likelihood 
fluctuates over time. 16In simplest terms, Cox PH models allow me to determine the risk 
of conflict termination given that the conflict has not terminated yet. Conflicts that are 
                                                          
16
 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?, 11. 
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ongoing, such as that in Afghanistan, are ‘censored,’ meaning that the model accounts for 
the fact that the case has not yet ended to date.  
 The dataset I created for this thesis builds upon that compiled by Patrick Regan 
for his article Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts.17 While 
Regan’s dataset claims to include all intrastate conflicts and associated third party 
interventions in the post-WWII period, I found a number of errors and inconsistencies 
that I corrected when I applied my own variables to the dataset. As a result, my final 
dataset resembles Regan’s in structure, but for the most part only includes data on 
duration and third party involvement that I have meticulously coded on my own. 
 My operational definition of a civil war is less restrictive than the Correlates of 
War definition, which requires at least 1,000 battle deaths per year. I included all 
conflicts that reached at least 200 deaths per year, but marked the conflict as low intensity 
(a control variable) if it did not meet the 1,000 deaths/year threshold.18 Data on third 
party interventions and their respective qualities was coded from the International 
Military Intervention Database (IMI)19 and original research was conducted on each 
intervention to verify IMI’s coding. 
                                                          
17
 Patrick M. Regan, "Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts," The Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, 40:2 (1996). 
Patrick M. Regan, "Third-party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts," Journal of Conflict 
Resolution. 46:1 (2002), 55-73. 
18
 Data on battle deaths was compiled from the dataset: Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, 
“Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths,” European Journal of 
Population, 21:2–3 (2005): 145–166. 
19
 Frederic S. Pearson and Robert A. Baumann, “International Military Intervention,” Inter-University 
Consortium for Political Science and Social Research, Data Collection no. 605 (University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor: 1993). 
Emizet F. Kisangani and Jeffery Pickering, “International Military Intervention, 1989-2005,” Inter-
University Consortium for Political Science and Social Research, Data Collection no. 21282 (University of 
Michigan, Ann Arbor: 2008). 
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 In Chapter III, I test the following five hypotheses of varying complexity with my 
Coxph models:  
   
 
Hypothesis 1: Contemporary peace enforcement operations will decrease the expected 
duration of a conflict. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Contemporary peace enforcement operations will decrease the expected 
duration of a conflict more than conventional third party intervention. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Modern peace enforcement operations that utilize an appropriate spoiler 
management strategy and level of cooperation with UN peacekeepers will 
decrease the expected duration of a conflict. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Third party interventions that utilize an appropriate spoiler management 
strategy will decrease the expected duration of a conflict. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Third party interventions motivated by concerns for regional stability and 
human rights will decrease the expected duration of a conflict more than 
interventions motivated by economic/military interests or ideological concerns. 
 
Most importantly, I find evidence in Chapter III to confirm hypothesis 3 which is in 
essence the core argument of this thesis. I conclude that while my results are statistically 
significant and indicate a strong relationship between the variables, more rigorous testing 
is needed to confirm my hypotheses through the inclusion of more control variables, or 
covariates. 
 
Case Studies 
 In discussing controlled comparisons, the study of two or more instances of a 
well-specified phenomenon that resemble each other in every respect but one, Alexander 
George and Andrew Bennett emphasize that it is extremely difficult (and sometimes 
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infeasible) in political science to find two or more cases that actually fit this criteria.20 
Considering the small number of civil war cases I can identify that feature genuine peace 
enforcement operations, the task of finding enough ‘similar’ cases was difficult from the 
outset. A number of authors have suggested ways for dealing with imperfect 
comparisons, and even more have come to accept that it is inevitable.21 Arend Lijphart, 
for example, while acknowledging that it is “difficult to find cases that are comparable 
enough and that one seldom can find cases similar in every respect but one, believes that 
‘these objections are founded on a too exacting scientific standard’ and that research can 
be accomplished by studies that approximate the standard as closely as possible.”22 New 
methodologies such as Adam Prezeworski and Henry Heune’s “most similar” design 
embody attempts to modify and relax Mill’s methods to account for problems of 
dissimilarity that pervade political science.23 
 To address the dissimilarity inherent in my small-n case study analysis, I attempt 
to come as close as possible to Mill’s method of similarity while supplementing my cases 
with process tracing. Overall, the logic of structured, focused comparisons is 
straightforward: “the method is ‘structured’ in that the researcher writes general questions 
that reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under 
study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison 
and culmination of the findings of the cases possible.”24 I employ this method precisely 
between three distinct instances of peace enforcement in two cases. Because of some 
                                                          
20
 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the social sciences 
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005), 151-152. 
21
 George, Case Studies, 164. 
22
 Arend Lijphart, Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method (Beuxelles, Belgique: Association 
International de Science Politique, 1969), 688. quoted in Case studies. 
23
 George, Case Studies, 165. 
24
 George, Case Studies, 67. 
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minor dissimilarities between my cases that transcend the dissimilar operational variables 
I am examining, I employ within-case analysis to establish the causal power of peace 
enforcement and specific operational variables in each instance.25 Charles Ragin and 
David Collier characterize this supplement as an alternative approach focused not only on 
the analysis of variables across cases, but on the causal path in a single case.26 George 
and Bennett take a firm position on this point by stating explicitly that it is “our 
position…that within-case analysis is essential to such [small-n] studies and can 
significantly ameliorate the limitations of Mill’s methods.”27 
 My case studies analyze three instances of peace enforcement (PE) that have 
occurred in two cases since the end of the Cold War. I classify three distinct mission 
outcomes in my cases: (1) no peace; (2) temporary peace; (3) lasting peace with 
settlement/peace agreement implementation. Peace enforcement in my two cases, Sierra 
Leone (which features two distinct instances of peace enforcement) and Afghanistan, is 
classified by mission impartiality (or the use of an appropriate spoiler management 
strategy) and whether or not UN peacekeepers played an instrumental role in the peace 
enforcement mission.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
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Table 1.2  
Case Selection 
 
       No Peace   Temporary Peace         Lasting Peace  
                     + Settlement  Implementation 
 
Impartial PE +         Sierra Leone 2000-2001 
Large UN Role          
 
Impartial PE +                         Sierra Leone 1991-1999             
No/Minor UN Role                                
 
Partial PE + 
No/Minor UN Role     Afghanistan 2001-present 
 
 
While there are some differences between these cases that transcend variations in 
operational impartiality and UN involvement, I find through process tracing that these 
two key variables are intimately linked to operational strategy and mission outcomes. In 
Afghanistan, for example, ISAF’s hardline anti-Taliban approach to the conflict and the 
absence of UN peacekeepers ultimately drove Taliban and Haqqani parties to the conflict, 
who were initially willing to negotiate a settlement with the central government, to adopt 
immutable goals and become powerful, total spoilers. Despite critical differences 
between Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, each have easily extractable resources (diamonds 
and opium, respectively) and a variety of other factors that fuel conflict and have been 
found to significantly increase the likelihood of conflict intractability as I outline in 
Chapter II.28 
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The three major questions I ask in each of my structured, focused comparisons are as 
follows:  
 
 1. What is the situational difficulty in the case, and what critical conflict variables 
 may have some impact on peace enforcement’s feasibility and outcome? 
 
 2. What are the key operational variables (features) of the peace enforcement 
 operation?  
 
 3. What was the conflict’s ultimate outcome, and was a settlement/ceasefire 
 successfully and sustainable implemented?  
 
These broad, overarching questions are further broken down into multiple components in 
Appendix I that allow me to address specific variables in each case.  
 The first case I explore in Chapter IV is Sierra Leone, which I divide into two 
distinct instances of peace enforcement. The first was unsuccessful (1991-1999) and saw 
a variety of actors attempt to make peace through the Abdijan cease-fire of 1996 and 
Lome agreement of 1999: both of which ultimately failed and resulted in renewed 
conflict. The second was from 2000-2001 during which the United Kingdom and 
UNAMSIL utilized an appropriate spoiler management strategy against the RUF and 
successfully implemented the Abuja agreements. The variation between the first and 
second major attempts to enforce peace makes this case especially good for analysis and 
comparison.  
 In Chapter V, I explore the Afghan civil war post-2001. Operation Enduring 
Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which have been 
heavily involved in the conflict since 2003, attempted to enforce peace and for a time 
succeeded (between 2003 and 2006). A US-driven hyper-coercive strategy against parties 
to the conflict who demonstrated a genuine willingness to reach a negotiated settlement 
  
27 
 
in 2003 coupled with the absence of UN peacekeepers proficient in post-conflict 
statebuilding and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), ultimately 
resulted in the ignition of a full-blown insurgency after 2007 that continues into March 
2013.  
 Chapter VI offers some conclusions and inevitable policy recommendations that 
flow from my analysis.  
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Chapter II 
Conceptualizing Peace Enforcement and Civil War 
  
 My thesis argues that peace enforcement operations have a clear causal effect 
upon both civil war termination, and the effectiveness of settlement implementation in 
their immediate aftermath. I argue that the causal mechanisms through which peace 
enforcement motivates belligerents to (a) genuinely agree to a ceasefire or negotiated 
settlement and (b) demobilize and abide by the terms of that settlement is by (1) 
counterbalancing belligerent military advantage and raising the cost of war and/or 
relative benefits of peace; (2) enforcing a settlement’s terms by making reneging more 
costly and providing the security guarantee necessary to prevent belligerents from taking 
advantage of their opponent’s compliance; and (3) establishing momentum in the DDR of 
belligerents so that a follow-on peacekeeping operation can be deployed successfully. My 
argument is premised upon a model of interaction between a government and rebel 
groups that entails mutual distrust and interrelated commitment problems that prevent 
belligerents from rationally committing to either (a) or (b) as cited above. This chapter 
begins by providing a brief overview of peace enforcement’s historical development 
before outlining a theoretical model of belligerent interaction in civil war and engaging in 
a review of the existing literature on peace support operations and third party intervention 
more generally. Qualitative literature will be explored first, followed by quantitative 
studies of civil war termination, peace support operations, and situational difficulty. 
 Because existing literature on contemporary peace enforcement is scant, much of 
Chapter II is devoted to constructing a common framework for my argument by 
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exploring existing scholarship on civil war, peace operations, and civil war termination 
more broadly.  
 
Peace Enforcement’s Roots 
 While the normative foundations for modern peace enforcement were first laid by 
the League of Nations in the mid to late 1920s,29 the United Nations Organization in the 
Congo (ONUC) is widely considered to be the international community’s first significant 
attempt at intrastate peace enforcement. Although ONUC’s involvement in the Congo 
Crisis between 1960 and 1964 would nearly bankrupt the United Nations and fail to 
prevent violence amidst covert US and Soviet involvement in the conflict, the precedent 
set by ONUC would ultimately plant the seeds for peace enforcement’s revival in the 
aftermath of the Cold War.  
 In 1992, shortly after the conclusion of the Gulf War, UN Secretary General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali was asked by the Security Council to prepare a comprehensive 
report on how the United Nations’ capacity for preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, 
and peacekeeping could be made more effective.30 The resulting report, An Agenda for 
Peace, outlined Boutros-Ghali’s vision for peace enforcement as the midpoint between 
peacekeeping and full scale enforcement operations: 
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The purpose of peace enforcement units (perhaps they should be called “cease-
fire enforcement units”) would be to enable the United Nations to deploy troops 
quickly to enforce a ceasefire by taking coercive action against either party, or 
both, if they violate it…The concept goes beyond peacekeeping to the extent that 
the operation would be deployed without the express consent of the two 
parties…UN troops would be authorized to use force to ensure respect for the 
cease-fire.31 
 
While the underlying legal basis for Boutros-Ghali’s proposal was already present in 
Chapter VII, Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter, political deadlock on the Security 
Council during the Cold War had previously prevented the UN from deploying any 
meaningful Chapter VII peacekeeping missions to mitigate intrastate disputes. 
 Eager to take advantage of the UNSC’s recent thaw by testing the limits of UN 
peacekeeping, 20 new UN missions were authorized and launched between 1988 and 
1993 including two UN ‘peace enforcement’ missions in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II) 
and Bosnia (UNPROFOR). While aesthetically robust (endowed with both the legal 
mandate and means necessary to be effective), a lack of political will on the part of 
member states rendered these new ‘enforcement’ missions practically impotent in the 
face of escalating violence and ethnic cleansing. Coupled with well-publicized 
peacekeeping failures in Rwanda and Angola, these costly experiments with ‘peace 
enforcement’ would ultimately prompt the United Nations to take a brief hiatus from 
peacekeeping in the late 1990s. During this hiatus the seeds for the emergence and spread 
of modern peace enforcement would be planted—first by NATO’s conduct of the first 
true peace enforcement operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and second through the 
United Nations’ radical reassessment of its strategic approach to peacekeeping and peace 
support operations.  
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Ascension and Proliferation  
 In 1995, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) carried out the 
international community’s first modern peace enforcement operation in Croatia, Bosnia, 
and Herzegovina. Amidst escalating violence and ethnic cleansing in the Bosnian war, 
the UN-led peacekeeping contingent, UNPROFOR or the UN Protection Force, proved 
unable to adequately protect UN designated “Safe Areas”32 from Serbian forces or deliver 
humanitarian aid to their inhabitants (even with NATO air support and a Chapter VII 
mandate).  In response, UNPROFOR’s commander, British Lieutenant General Rupert 
Smith, gave NATO the green light needed to conduct air attacks against the Serbs—
effectively giving NATO the approval it needed to initiate its own UN-endorsed peace 
enforcement operation.33 Alongside Croat and Bosniac advances, NATO air attacks 
raised the cost of war for the Serbians and provided the leverage needed to move the US-
led negotiating effort forward. In November 1995, Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević 
signed the Dayton Accords that effectively ended the conflict; less than a month later, the 
first elements of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) were deployed into Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to implement the Accords—initiating the second stage of NATO’s 
peace enforcement operation in the conflict.34 A year later, the NATO-led multinational 
peacekeeping force, Stabilization Force or SFOR, was deployed to replace IFOR and 
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keep the peace IFOR had made and implemented two years prior. In many ways, 
NATO’s peace enforcement operation in Bosnia continues to serve as a model for 
enforcement operations in the present day, and is responsible for establishing a number of 
precedents and norms that still surround the use of force, and non-UN peace enforcement 
and peacekeeping operations.  
 Almost simultaneously with NATO’s enforcement operations in Bosnia, the 
United Nations experienced a period of dramatic transformation during which its 
strategic approach to peace support operations was redefined, and the scope of operations 
it was willing and able to conduct limited. First, in 1999, two inquiries into the genocides 
in Rwanda35 and Srebrenica36 laid bare the political and strategic shortcomings that led to 
the UN’s loss of credibility in the late 1990s and the near-dissolution of UN 
peacekeeping that occurred thereafter. The next year, the Brahimi Report37 explicitly 
outlined the United Nations’ nuanced strategic approach to peacekeeping and articulated 
the UN’s refusal to deploy peacekeepers into future ongoing conflicts without a broad 
and explicit mandate for the use of force and civilian protection, and the means necessary 
to fulfill such a robust mandate. The release of these scathing, self-critical reports 
alongside the radical overhaul of the UN’s peacekeeping strategy precipitated a more 
positive outlook on peacekeeping internationally, and within the United Nations itself. 
The reelection of Kofi Annan, the former head of the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO), as Secretary General and appointment of Richard Holbrooke 
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(instrumental in negotiating the Dayton Accord) as US Ambassador to the UN sent a 
clear signal of renewed international support for the revival of UN peacekeeping.38   
 Between 1999 and 2004, UN peacekeeping rebounded in a big way as a number 
of new UN missions with robust mandates were deployed in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and East Timor. Alongside three of these 
missions, non-UN actors would follow in NATO’s footsteps by launching their own 
substantial enforcement operations to terminate the conflict and enable floundering UN 
peacekeepers to accomplish their own long-term strategic objectives. Launched in 
tandem with the institutionalization of the Brahimi Report, these enforcement operations 
reflected a nuanced strategic relationship between United Nations peacekeepers, and 
independent states and organizations. While the United Nations was understandably 
weary of deploying its peacekeepers into ongoing conflicts post-Brahimi, a partnership 
with non-UN actors established a viable division of labor based upon relative legitimacy 
and force capability: non-UN actors provided the robust military capacity necessary to 
coerce conflict termination, and the UN provided the impartial expertise necessary to 
preserve and build peace after enforcement operations scaled back or ceased.   
 In what many scholars term ‘subcontracting,’ the UN has in recent years “entered 
into different types of contractual relationships with service-providing NGOs, regional 
organizations, and pivotal states…to overcome its lack of enforcement capability and 
simultaneously ensure that [these actors] promote the purposes and principals of the UN 
Charter rather than their own interest.”39 Despite initial reservations during the Cold War, 
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references to regional organizations have appeared in a number of UNSC resolutions 
since 1991. Regional organizations have been delegated under Chapter VII to use force in 
a number of cases such as Yugoslavia (1992), Haiti (1993), and Sierra Leone (1997), 
ultimately inspiring then-Secretary General Boutros-Ghali to author Supplement to An 
Agenda for Peace in 1997, urging the UN to make better use of its partnerships and 
engage in joint operations with non-UN actors.40 Simultaneously, a number of regional 
organizations and single states began developing their own strategic doctrines and 
manuals for the conduct of peace operations—signaling their embrace of this new 
responsibility. 
 First in Kosovo, NATO built upon the precedent it established in Bosnia by 
launching operation “Allied Force,” an air operation against Serb forces, and later 
Kosovo Force (KFOR), a full scale peace enforcement mission alongside the UN Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Later that year, in East Timor, the UN 
authorized the deployment of Australian-led International Forces in East Timor 
(INTERFET) under a Chapter VII mandate to halt escalating violence and prevent the 
country from sliding into civil war—enabling the UN to deploy the Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) shortly thereafter. In Sierra Leone, like 
Kosovo, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) teamed up with a regional 
organization, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG), to combat Charles Taylor’s supremely destructive Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF). When the UN and ECOMOG (composed primarily of Nigerian troops) 
encountered stiff resistance and heavy casualties, the United Kingdom deployed its own 
peace enforcement operation in 2000, with the UN Security Council’s support, to defeat 
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the RUF and finally establish a true peace for UNAMSIL to keep. With three of the four 
major UN peacekeeping missions launched in 1999 relying heavily on their non-UN, 
peace enforcement counterparts to achieve success, peacekeeping’s turn-of-the-century 
revival would also mark modern peace enforcement’s decisive inception. Since then, 
peace enforcement operations have been successful in a number of diverse cases as 
recently as in Operation Serval—the French-led, UN-backed 2013 operation into 
Northern Mali. Partly in response to the perceived threat posed by international terrorism 
and the far-reaching effects of the Arab Spring, western nations have demonstrated an 
unprecedented willingness since 2010 to commit substantial military assets to assist in 
achieving peace in ongoing intrastate conflicts. From Pakistan and Afghanistan, to Libya, 
Syria, Yemen Cote D’Ivoire, Uganda, and now Mali, western militaries have willingly 
embroiled themselves, either overtly or covertly, in the throes of civil war. 
 Despite peace enforcement’s predominant role in facilitating UN success in Sierra 
Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and countless other notable cases, the most recent wave of 
literature41 on peace operations (which emerged partly in response to these successes) 
focuses almost exclusively on answering outstanding questions about UN 
multidimensional peacekeeping while neglecting to explore peace enforcement and its 
effects. Answering such basic empirical questions as whether peacekeeping makes peace 
more durable and why some missions are more successful than others, scholars have 
found, overwhelmingly, that peacekeeping makes civil war much less likely to resume 
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once a ceasefire is in place,42 but can have an insignificant or even counterproductive 
impact on peace when deployed before a settlement has been established.43  
 Considering these deeply troubling revelations and the pivotal role peace 
enforcement plays in laying the groundwork for the successful deployment of 
peacekeeping missions, it is somewhat surprising that recent research has, for the most 
part, failed to examine peace enforcement operations in depth.  Partly attributable to 
scholars’ vague and often inconsistent classification of peace operations, namely a 
tendency to lump peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations together in their 
research, our current understanding of peace enforcement is both incomplete and 
grounded in methodologically flawed research. Even scholars such as Virginia Fortna and 
Lise Howard, who have essentially pioneered the contemporary study of peace support 
operations, oftentimes fail to distinguish between peacekeeping and peace enforcement in 
their case studies and quantitative analyses.  
 
Framing Civil War: Problems of Credible Commitment and Mutual Distrust 
 Modern civil wars typically end in one of two ways: through an outright military 
victory by one side, or with a negotiated settlement. Oftentimes however, civil wars are 
“all or nothing” enterprises. As James Fearon and David Laitin so eloquently state, 
“never will a rebel group say ‘we are fighting in order to induce the government to 
change its policy on X, and once that is accomplished we will disband and leave 
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politics.”44 Rather, intractable civil wars are perpetuated by problems of credible 
commitment—rebels cannot trust the government to implement their desired policies, and 
the government in turn cannot trust the rebels enough to offer policy concessions in 
exchange for their demobilization. Partly as a result of this prisoner’s dilemma, civil wars 
since 1940 are significantly more likely to end in an outright military victory (70%) than 
in a negotiated settlement (19%) or a ceasefire/stalemate (11%).45  
 While this may suggest that military victories are empirically ‘more effective’ 
than negotiated settlements at resolving intrastate conflicts, the international community 
and United Nations have a strong preference for the latter. In many ways this preference 
is understandable: negotiated settlements are overwhelmingly seen as more impartial and 
legitimate in that they prevent the destruction of one or more parties to a conflict and 
avoid granting one actor a monopoly over a nation’s political and material resources. 
Unlike military victories, however, negotiated settlements rely solely on positive and 
negative benefits to entice actor compliance. In other words, rational belligerents will 
only willingly become party to a settlement if they determine it will provide them with 
benefits that outweigh the potential benefits minus the risks they associate with 
continuing hostilities.  
 Because of this, settlements entail a wide variety of commitment problems that 
prevent disarmament,46 the establishment of power sharing institutions,47 and inherently 
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lack what Stedman terms a ‘security guarantee’— a potentially coercive mechanism 
(safeguard) to prevent actors from taking advantage of a settlement.48 Without a security 
guarantee to forestall deception and backstabbing, settlements are just too risky for 
belligerents to accept. Rather than incentivize compliance, settlements by their very 
nature can incentivize both parties to renege on their commitments and catch their 
opponents off guard. Because contracting parties to a settlement rarely (if ever) possess 
identical force capabilities, weaker belligerents will naturally  be tempted to turn 
settlements into strategic ceasefires and gain the strategic upper hand in a conflict while 
stronger belligerents will be tempted to use the opportunity to exterminate their adversary 
once and for all. Monica Toft labels this force disparity between contracting parties 
disequilibrium, implying that if at least one party possesses a significant military 
advantage over the other, the risk the weaker party takes in signing the settlement 
outweighs most potential benefits.49 In sum, signing a peace agreement puts leaders at 
risk from both their adversaries who may take advantage of a settlement, and disgruntled 
followers who may see it as a betrayal of their key values.50 
 On average, and primarily because of this security dilemma, civil wars last 
significantly longer than interstate wars.51 While combatants in interstate conflicts 
usually retain their armies and political authority after a peace deal is reached, 
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combatants in civil wars must put blind faith in a negotiated settlement or fight to the 
death by choosing “all or nothing.” Considering this, it comes as no surprise that for 
conflicts in the post-WWII era, the median duration of intrastate wars was about seven 
years, compared to less than three months for interstate wars during that same period.52 
 In the view of most scholars, negotiated settlements are often only viable when a 
neutral third party actor is introduced who is able to implement a settlement and 
counterbalance disequilibrium (create equilibrium). Barbara Walter, who provides a 
framework for conceptualizing problems associated with negotiated settlements, argues 
that the most serious impediment to durable peace is an inability for actors to commit to 
the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of their soldiers.53 Arising 
from insecurity, these commitment problems can only be overcome by the introduction of 
a third party who is willing and able to enforce a negotiated settlement—thereby 
alleviating the risk of an adversary reneging on the agreement and strategically resuming 
hostilities in the midst of DDR. Third party enforcers can, in other words, “guarantee that 
groups will be protected, terms will be fulfilled, and promises will be kept”54 by 
increasing the cost of noncooperation. Walter even goes so far as to claim that third-party 
guarantees of security are the key determinants of successful peace agreement 
implementation.55  
 Stephen John Stedman advances a similar and more comprehensive theory for 
why negotiated settlements fail. According to Stedman, Walter’s conceptualization of 
distrust is incomplete. While he partly agrees with Walter that fear compels parties to 
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violate or oppose peace agreements, motivation and other factors also play a significant 
role in informing belligerent choice. Stedman suggests that the first step towards 
formulating a successful implementation strategy is to “recognize that parties in civil 
wars differ in their goals and commitments—dimensions that are crucial for 
understanding why some parties undermine peace agreements” and others do not. For this 
reason, I pay close attention in my case studies to whether rebels are vying for the center 
or power, or merely control of a region. 
 Stedman and David Rothchild cite six recurrent problems that plague 
implementation agreements in civil wars: vague and expedient agreements, a lack of 
coordination between mediators and implementers, lack of coordination among 
implementing agencies, the incomplete fulfillment of mandated tasks, a short time 
horizon and limited commitment of implementers, and the presence of spoilers—“leaders 
or factions who use violence to undermine implementation.”56 In his later work, 57 
Stedman elaborates upon the spoiler concept by creating a typology of spoilers based 
upon their position in the peace process, number, intent, and whether spoiling behavior 
rests with leaders or followers of a party. He also proposes specific strategies for 
managing different types of spoilers.  
 In Stedman’s view, decoding spoiler behavior and motivation is the key to 
determining why some parties undermine peace agreements and others do not: and 
formulating appropriate strategic responses to spoiler behavior. While most authors have 
a tendency to boil intrastate belligerent behavior down to sterile cost-benefit calculations, 
Stedman and Rothchild are nuanced in that they attempt to account for actors who are not 
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necessarily rational—and are motivated by deep-seated ideological or religious beliefs.  
While my argument assumes that civil war termination is primarily hindered by mutual 
distrust and interrelated commitment problems, the presence of spoilers and utilization of 
spoiler management strategies are also key variables in my analysis. Consequently, I 
explore Stedman’s spoiler classification scheme at length.  
 Stedman classifies spoilers as (1) limited, (2) greedy or (3) total depending upon 
the goals they pursue and their commitment to achieving these goals:  
 
 At one end of the spectrum are limited spoilers, who have limited goals—for 
example, recognition and redress, security for its followers, [or] a share of power. 
At the other end of the spectrum are total spoilers, who pursue total power and the 
exclusive recognition of authority and hold immutable preferences: that is, their 
goals are not subject to change. Total spoilers are led by individuals who see the 
world in all-or-nothing terms and often suffer from pathological tendencies that 
prevent the pragmatism necessary for compromise settlements of conflict. Total 
spoilers often espouse radical ideologies; total power is a means to achieving such 
goals as the violent transformation of society. Greedy spoilers lie between the 
limited spoiler and total spoiler. The greedy spoiler holds goals that expand or 
contract based upon calculations of cost and risk. A greedy spoiler may have 
limited goals that expand when faced with low costs and risks; alternatively, it 
may have total goals that contract when faced with high costs and risks.58 
 
With only superficial knowledge of a conflict, it is relatively easy to infer which category 
a spoiler falls into. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, for example, 
was led by several pathological individuals such as Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh, 
and sought total power and authority as demonstrated through its failure to adhere to 
either the Abidjan or Lome peace processes. As such, Sierra Leone’s civil war only ended 
after the RUF was coerced to the negotiating table with overwhelming coercive force. By 
Stedman’s classification, the RUF would undoubtedly be considered a greedy, bordering 
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on total, spoiler. Conversely, other spoilers or groups of spoilers can sometimes be 
significantly more complex and difficult to deconstruct—such as Laurent Gbagbo and his 
forces in the Second Ivorian Civil War, or the Taliban/Haqqani who over time evolved 
from limited spoilers willing to negotiate a power sharing agreement to a mix of total and 
greedy spoilers perpetuated by profit and advancing an immutable, radical religious 
ideology. 
 Drawing from his typology of spoilers, Stedman argues that international actors 
overseeing the implementation of peace agreements should shape their strategy according 
to the type of spoiler they are attempting to control. Stedman cites the three primary 
strategies used to manage spoilers that I adopt in my case studies and policy 
recommendations: 
 
 1) Inducement, or giving the spoiler what it wants,  
 
 2) Socialization, or changing the behavior of the spoiler to adhere to a set 
of established norms, and 
 
 3) Coercion, or punishing spoiler behavior or reducing the capacity of the 
spoiler to destroy the peace process.59 
 
Effective peace enforcement operations utilize these three strategies in varying capacities. 
Inducement is typically used when spoiler behavior is caused by fear and a demand for 
greater protection (as Walter discusses).60 The introduction of a third party can create 
‘force equilibrium’ and alleviate security concerns motivating spoiling behavior. 
Socialization involves strategically using carrots and sticks to raise the cost of 
noncooperation while enticing or coercing spoilers into complying with peace agreements 
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and settlements. Coercion, used primarily with total spoilers, is observable in Sierra 
Leone and Libya, and relies on the use or threat of punishment to deter unacceptable 
spoiler behavior and reduce the capacity of spoilers to disrupt the peace process.61 While 
Stedman, writing in 1997, points out that the application of force to defeat a spoiler is 
incredibly rare, the recent proliferation of peace enforcement has finally placed Chapter 
VII mandated coercion on the table as a viable strategic option for implementing peace 
agreements.  
 The theoretical framework outlined above adds critical structure to my causal 
theory of peace enforcement success and posits that, for the most part, changes in third 
party intervention status can alter belligerent cost-benefit calculations and expedite civil 
war termination.62 Highlighting the interplay between actor capacity, actor behavior and 
motivation, and implementation strategy, the work of Stedman, Toft, and others makes it 
possible to understand the mutual distrust and interrelated commitment problems that 
inhibit both civil war termination and settlement implementation. Working within their 
framework allows me to clearly explore peace enforcement’s impact and the causal 
mechanisms through which it functions. Within this framework, peace enforcement 
operations can accomplish a wide variety of objectives including alleviating parties’ fear 
of victimization by providing security, facilitating the negotiation and implementation of 
peace agreements, reassuring parties of each other’s compliance with the terms of a 
negotiated settlement, identifying and combating spoilers, and promoting more moderate 
actors in the resolution process. 
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Literature Review 
 While the vast majority of existing scholarship on peace operations explores 
multidimensional peacekeeping almost exclusively, some recent studies have gone to 
great lengths to identify variables and strategies that empirically impact the outcomes of 
third party intervention and attempts at peace agreement implementation. Because it 
would be possible to write an entire thesis on the content and variable quality of 
contemporary literature on UN peacekeeping and third party intervention,63 I will focus 
on only the most pertinent and methodologically sound scholarship to date. For the most 
part, this recent scholarship is quantitative in nature: identifying environmental variables 
such as the presence of spoilers that increase situational difficulty, and how success 
varies between actors (UN, regional organizations, etc.) involved in peace operations. 
Determinant studies, designed to ascertain which variables are associated with 
implementation success or failure, have been especially popular in recent years (but are 
also of varying quality). Despite their strictly quantitative nature, some of these analyses 
provide valuable insight into the principal weaknesses of implementation strategies by 
highlighting variables that are applicable to a large spread of dissimilar cases. In this 
literature review, the most rigorous motivational, environmental, and determinant studies 
will be reviewed first, followed by studies of ‘subcontracting’ that provide insight into 
variations in legitimacy and relative capacity and, finally, scholarship examining 
determinants of civil war duration and termination. 
 Writing on the actor dynamics underlying civil conflict, a number of authors have 
explored the motives and grievances that drive individual and group decisions to 
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participate in rebellion. Ted Gurr advances relative deprivation theory, which views 
tensions that develop from a discrepancy between the “ought” and “is” of collective value 
satisfaction as partially responsible for rebellious behavior.64 Macartan Humphreys and 
Jeremy Weinstein view the decision to rebel as distinct from the decision to participate in 
civil war violence. In other words, individuals with participative agency weigh the costs 
and benefits of participating in rebellion before determining whether they can somehow 
achieve material gain through participation in civil war violence.65 Paul Collier and Anke 
Hoffler’s test of these two competing ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ theories finds little 
explanatory power for Gurr’s grievance theory of rebellion but considerable support for 
greed theory.66 Most scholars believe that there is considerable interplay between greed 
and grievance theory, and other theories of individual participation such as social 
sanctions, which posits that individuals are pressured or coerced by their local 
communities or social organizations into participating in civil war violence.67 While I 
deal only briefly with individual motivation in my case studies, these theories are 
important to keep in mind when thinking through the participatory mechanisms 
underlying broader environmental determinants of situational difficulty.  
 Stedman and George Downs, writing in 2002,  cite three principal environmental 
variables as deterministic of peacekeeping failure: the presence of spoilers, the presence 
of valuable commodities or spoils, and the presence of neighboring states that oppose the 
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peace agreement. 68 They complement these findings with an analysis of how cases of 
peace implementation vary depending upon the willingness of international actors to 
provide resources and risk the deployment of troops. They conclude that while the UN 
can succeed at peace implementation in the easiest conflict environments, regional or 
major power interest is crucial to succeed in the most difficult ones. This is because 
without major power interest, the robust mandate, resources, and troops necessary for 
coercive strategies to succeed will not be provided.  
 Similarly, Doyle and Sambanis69 explore the nexus among strategy, context, and 
resources in their rigorous quantitative analysis of all civil wars since 1945.70 They find 
that variables such as the presence of a treaty, scale of death and displacement, war 
motivations other than identity, war duration, a small number of factions, and lack of 
natural resource dependence all create easier environments for implementation. Their 
main argument is that three central factors constitute a ‘peace-building triangle’ that 
characterizes and explains what is needed to establish postwar civil peace: “the deeper 
the hostility, the more the destruction of local capacities, the more one needs international 
assistance to succeed in establishing a stable peace.”71 Secondary arguments claim that 
peacebuilding has a higher success rate than military victories in recent years 
(challenging Toft), that peace operations must be specifically tailored to fit each 
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individual case, and economic reconstruction must accompany peacebuilding operations 
to increase the probability of success.72  
  Recently, scholars have transcended a strictly UN-centric evaluation of 
peacekeeping and have begun to assess what Bellamy et al. term the ‘subcontracting’ of 
operations—something especially pertinent to my analysis of peace enforcement and 
exploration of cases involving a wide variety of actors. While arguments have been made 
for and against the involvement of regional organizations and single states in UN-
chartered peace operations, this normative shift in favor of subcontracting73 has spawned 
a new strain of scholarship evaluating the comparative effectiveness of these 
organizations at conducting peace operations and third party intervention more generally. 
Patrick Regan, for example,74 who is interested in all types of economic and military third 
party intervention rather than peace operations specifically, analyzes data generated from 
all intrastate conflicts and any associated third-party interventions in the post-WWII 
period.75 He finds several trends: that interventions supporting the government were 
twice as likely to succeed as those supporting the opposition, interventions on the whole 
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are associated with longer running conflicts, and mixed intervention strategies that 
combine economic and military mechanisms are the most effective.  
 Conclusions such as these are common among studies that abstractly analyze 
external conflict intervention and its characteristics in a manner that is not actor-
specific.76 Important examples include Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom who estimate a 
hazards model of the duration of civil wars and find that ethnic fractionalization has a 
strong negative influence on the expected duration of conflict. They additionally find that 
the balance of capabilities between the government and rebels has no relationship with 
civil war duration.77 Lindsay and Enterline also use hazards models to argue that third-
party support for a government is associated with longer lasting civil wars while 
disputing the notion that ethnic homogeneity is related to the expected duration of 
conflict.78 Eldabawi and Sambanis use microeconomic models to show that external 
support for combatants can significantly affect the costs of continuing a war by making 
rebel fractionalization more likely—thereby increasing conflict length.79 While none of 
these studies are especially pertinent to my analysis, it is important to recognize previous 
research with hazards models on the duration of intrastate conflict. 
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 Several more pertinent studies have provided conflicting perspectives on the 
effectiveness of UN as opposed to non-UN peacekeeping operations. Case studies by 
Paul Diehl and William Durch describe potential advantages and disadvantages of UN 
and non-UN operations and offer detailed accounts of particular operations, but fail to 
provide explanations for variations in success between them. 80 Birger Heldt and Peter 
Wallensteen observe a similar success rate between UN and non-UN operations, but 
identify UN operations as succeeding in significantly more difficult environments 
overall.81 Heldt, cited in the same study, argues that UN and non-UN operations have the 
same success rate even if one controls for operational difficulty. 82 Virgninia Fortna’s 
analysis finds that peacekeeping has an overall positive effect, but is driven primarily by 
UN missions. 83 Sambanis and Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl compare the effects of the two by 
using Doyle and Sambanis’ ecological model of peacebuilding and find that although 
non-UN operations have no statistically significant effect on successful peacebuilding, 
UN operations have a large positive effect.84 However, they also find evidence that non-
UN peace operations complement UN operations, and that non-UN operations 
undertaken by militarily ‘advanced’ countries are often more successful at preventing the 
recurrence of war. 
 Scholars also disagree on the practical and theoretical differences between UN 
and non-UN operations. Diehl points out that non-UN operations are often perceived to 
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suffer from partiality, bias, logistical issues, vulnerability to domestic politics, and a lack 
of financial and material resources.85 Conversely, other authors cite the reverse of these 
problems as potential advantages of non-UN operations such as operational stability 
(over inconsistent and sometimes finite UN mandates), greater local and external support, 
and an ability to incorporate a wider range of stakeholders.86 While it is unlikely that this 
debate will be resolved any time soon, scholars across the board agree that three 
important components play into intervention success: legitimacy, impartiality, and 
technical expertise. I seek to explore all three of these components at length in my case 
studies and quantitative analysis.  
 Beyond determinant studies of peacekeeping and third party involvement in 
intrastate conflict, a larger, more theoretical body of literature complements and provides 
the foundation for the framework I outlined in the first section of this chapter. Harrison 
Wagner, for example, extracts from Clausewitz87 the idea that war is a bargaining 
process, entailing a constant risk that one side or the other will win outright when an offer 
for peace is rejected.88 William Zartman, who attempts to explain why belligerents would 
choose peace in the absence of a third party security guarantee, proposes the existence of 
‘ripe’ moments in civil conflict during which parties’ perception of a mutually hurting 
stalemate—a situation in which neither side can win, yet continuing the conflict will be 
very harmful—may encourage parties to seek a solution to conflict.89 While Zartman’s 
theory remains largely untested, it is always important to keep in mind. 
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Conclusion 
 In my case studies, the motivational theories outlines by Gurr and others in 
addition to determinant theories of conflict intractability help me accurately characterize 
both situational difficulty and the underlying factors motivating belligerent behavior. My 
use of these theories is most clearly outlined in my questions for structured-focused 
comparisons (Appendix I). Scholarship on ‘subcontracting’ by Diehl, Durch, and Doyle 
& Sambanis add initial credibility to one key aspect of my theory of peace enforcement 
success: close cooperation with UN peacekeepers help peace enforcers achieve and 
maintain operational legitimacy and impartiality in the eyes of belligerents. Stedman’s 
typology of spoilers and proposed strategies for spoiler management also features very 
prominently in my theory, and both my quantitative analysis and case studies. I adopt 
Stedman’s typology and argue that peace enforcement operations that correctly match 
their operational strategy to the type of spoiler they are attempting to manage are 
significantly more effective than those that do not. Finally, Walter, Stedman, and Toft’s 
work on settlement implementation and the potential for third party security guarantees to 
strategically alter belligerent behavior allow me to frame my theory and analysis in a 
manner that is consistent and easy to understand.  
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Chapter III 
Quantitative Evidence of Effectiveness 
 
 In this chapter, I test whether civil wars terminate faster with the presence of 
peace enforcement operations that utilize the appropriate spoiler management strategy 
and work closely with UN peacekeepers. The dataset I constructed for this analysis 
encompasses all intrastate conflicts and associated third party interventions between 1945 
and March 2013, and is modeled after Patrick Regan’s dataset on interventions in civil 
conflicts.90 In my duration models, I use Cox proportional hazards models (henceforth 
Cox PH models) to determine the underlying “hazard” (likelihood) of civil war 
termination both with and without peace enforcement. Below, I test the following 5 
hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Contemporary peace enforcement operations will decrease the expected 
duration of a conflict. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Contemporary peace enforcement operations will decrease the expected 
duration of a conflict more than conventional third party intervention. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Modern peace enforcement operations that utilize an appropriate spoiler 
management strategy and level of cooperation with UN peacekeepers will 
decrease the expected duration of a conflict. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Third party interventions that utilize an appropriate spoiler management 
strategy will decrease the expected duration of a conflict. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Third party interventions motivated by concerns for regional stability and 
human rights will decrease the expected duration of a conflict more than third 
party interventions motivated by economic/military interests or ideological 
concerns. 
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I ultimately confirm three of my hypotheses (the most relevant being hypothesis 3) and 
conclude that peace enforcement operations, regardless of their force capability, do 
indeed have a positive, significant impact on civil war termination that is enhanced 
further by the use of Stephen Stedman’s typological spoiler management strategy and 
maintenance of close cooperation with United Nations peacekeepers.  
 
Dataset and Variables 
 While coding my dataset, I operationally defined a civil war as a conflict that 
reached at least 200 battle deaths per year. Because this is significantly less restrictive 
than the Correlates of War (COW) definition91 which requires at least 1000 battle deaths 
per year, and more restrictive than the UCDP/PRIO definition92 of 25 battle deaths per 
year, I mark conflicts with less than 1000 deaths per year as low intensity (a control 
variable) in my dataset. Conflicts are coded by month, and ongoing conflicts are censored 
so as to account for the fact that they have not yet terminated at the time of writing. Two 
of my key dichotomous explanatory variables, an intervention’s use of an appropriate 
spoiler management strategy and cooperation with UN peacekeepers, require further 
explanation.  
 I coded a military intervention as utilizing an appropriate spoiler management 
strategy if three conditions were met:  
 
 1)  The operation consistently applied limited coercive force against belligerents 
who demonstrated immutable goals (total spoilers) and no interest in a peace 
settlement, and/or belligerents who repeatedly reneged on peace agreements 
depending upon circumstance (greedy spoilers). 
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 2) It did not attempt to appease belligerents demonstrating total or greedy spoiling 
behavior. 
 
 3) It did not use coercive force against limited spoilers, or belligerents willing to 
agree to a ceasefire or abide by a settlement. 
 
Coding of cooperation with UN peacekeepers was significantly more straightforward. No 
contemporary peace enforcement missions deployed to date alongside UN peacekeepers 
have failed to cooperate and coordinate extensively with UN personnel. Intervener 
motives, strength, and the target of the intervention were coded from the International 
Military Intervention Database (IMI)93 and verified through original research, while the 
conflict type was coded from either the COW database or UCDP. 
 
Interpreting Results 
 Rather than yield coefficients such as in linear or logistic regression models, Cox 
PH models yield hazards ratios (HR). Hazards ratios are interpreted relative to 1. In this 
case, ratios significantly less than 1 indicate that a variable is estimated to reduce the 
hazard, or risk, of civil war termination while ratios significantly greater than 1 mark an 
increased risk of termination. For example, if a dichotomous variable has a hazard ratio 
of 2, its presence indicates that the likelihood of civil war termination is 200%, or double 
(100%), what it would be if it was not present. Conversely, a hazard ratio of .97 indicates 
that the variable’s presence makes civil war termination 97% what it would be if the 
variable was not present—or, the variable’s presence makes civil war termination (the 
hazard) less likely. In short, variables with hazards ratios greater than 1 indicate an 
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increased chance of civil war termination while variables less than 1 indicate a decrease 
in the hazard.  
 My summary statistic tables display the hazard ratio (HR), robust standard errors 
(RSE) and level of statistical significance for each finding (P>|Z|). Significance codes are 
as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05.  
 
Results 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are purposefully broad, and intended to provide a more general, 
illustrative test of peace enforcement’s effectiveness both overall and relative to 
conventional third party intervention: 
 
  Hypothesis 1: Contemporary peace enforcement operations will decrease the 
expected duration of a conflict. 
 
 Hypothesis 2: Contemporary peace enforcement operations will decrease the 
expected duration of a conflict more than conventional third party intervention. 
 
 
 
Table 3.1 
Effects of Contemporary Peace Enforcement without Controls 
 
                 Model 1 CoxPH                                    Model 2 CoxPH 
                                    HR        P > |Z|                           HR P > |Z| 
                                     (RSE)                                       (RSE) 
 
Modern Peace Enforcement  1.75 .107                 1.72 .141 
                  (.34)              (.37) 
 
 
While the first model examines contemporary peace enforcement’s impact on civil war 
termination across all conflicts, the second examines its relationship only within a subset 
of those conflicts featuring some type of third party intervention—in other words, model 
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2 compares contemporary peace enforcement’s effectiveness to that of traditional third 
party intervention. Neither of these models are statistically significant (Table 3.1), but the 
1 < x hazard ratio indicates that in both models, peace enforcement (PE) positively 
increases the likelihood (risk) of civil war termination—by 75% in the first model and 
72% in the second.  The survival curves below nicely illustrate these relationships in a 
manner that is visually striking and relatively easy to understand: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
57 
 
Figure 3.1: Peace Enforcement’s Impact on Conflict Duration across All Cases 
 
Figure 3.2: Peace Enforcement’s Impact Compared to Conventional Third Party 
Intervention 
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 While my first two hypotheses are intended to be primarily illustrative, 
Hypothesis 3 is the true test of my overall argument:  
  
Hypothesis 3: Modern peace enforcement operations that utilize an appropriate spoiler 
management strategy and level of cooperation with UN peacekeepers will 
decrease the expected duration of a conflict. 
 
To test this hypothesis, I constructed three distinct models. Each model features an 
interaction term to assess the relationship between conflict duration, and contemporary 
peace enforcement operations utilizing the appropriate spoiler management strategy and 
cooperating with UN peacekeepers. The first features no control variables while the 
second and third control for conflict type and intensity as covariates. Additionally, the 
third includes whether or not the peace enforcer was a regional organization in the 
interaction term. Turning to Table 3.2, it is clear that models 1 and 2 are statistically 
significant and predict the effect I hypothesize. While model 3 is not statistically 
significant, it does predict a similar increased hazard ratio.  
 The results in models 1 and 2 are striking to say the least. The hazard ratios for 
peace enforcement operations with those features discussed ranges from 2.6 in model 1 to 
2.98 when control variables are included in model 2—a minor difference. In other words, 
having peace enforcement operations present that utilize the appropriate spoiler 
management strategy and cooperate with UN peacekeepers increases the hazard, or risk, 
of civil war termination by 157%—198%, all else equal.  
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Table 3.2 
Effects of Contemporary Peace Enforcement Operations Utilizing the Appropriate Spoiler Management Strategy and 
Cooperating with UN Peacekeepers 
 
                  Model 1 CoxPH           Model 2 CoxPH              Model 3 CoxPH 
                                        HR        P > |Z|               HR   P > |Z|              HR       P > |Z| 
                                                    (RSE)                              (RSE)              (RSE) 
 
Modern Peace Enforcement:  2.596    .0157*                  2.98        .00723**               —  
Spoiler strategy: UN Cooperation (.395)                               (.4060)     
            
:Regional Actor                                     —                                         —                            3.19  .11 
                      (.2) 
 
 
To further test the core argument of my thesis—that peace enforcement operations with 
the qualities outlined above will achieve the same results regardless of force capability—
I run two more models controlling for strength (Table 3.3). Strength in this case is 
measured by troop numbers, and access to air power in the first model, and additionally 
whether or not the enforcer is a western state in the second model.  
 
 
Table 3.3 
Controlling for Force Capability 
 
                      Model 1 CoxPH                             Model 2 CoxPH 
                                         HR        P > |Z|                   HR     P > |Z| 
                                         (RSE)                               (RSE) 
 
Modern Peace Enforcement:     4.18      .004**                4.69 .0022** 
Spoiler strategy: UN Cooperation          (.49)                             (.5) 
 
 
Both tests also come back significant with the effect I predict on the hazard of civil war 
termination. Controlling for force capability, peace enforcement operations with the 
aforementioned qualities increase the hazard of civil war termination by 318%, and 369% 
if the operation is carried out by at least one western nation. 
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 Taking advantage of my extensive dataset, I test two more hypotheses that are 
only loosely related to peace enforcement:  
 
Hypothesis 4: Third party interventions that utilize an appropriate spoiler management 
strategy will decrease the expected duration of a conflict. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Third party interventions motivated by concerns for regional stability and 
human rights will decrease the expected duration of a conflict more than third 
party interventions motivated by economic/military interests or ideological 
concerns. 
 
Model 1 and 3 in Table 3.4 test hypothesis 4 while Model 2 tests hypothesis 5. Model 1 
and 3 confirm hypothesis 4, and indicate that regardless of the intervention type, utilizing 
the appropriate spoiler management strategy significantly increases the hazard of civil 
war termination. Model 2 returns statistically insignificant results despite indicating that 
interventions motivated by concerns for regional stability and human rights have an 
overall positive effect on the hazard of civil war termination.  
 
 
Table 3.4 
Effects of Contemporary Peace Enforcement Operations Utilizing the Appropriate Spoiler Management Strategy 
and Cooperating with UN Peacekeepers 
 
                     Model 1 CoxPH     Model 2 CoxPH          Model 3 CoxPH 
                                       HR        P > |Z|              HR P > |Z|                HR      P > |Z| 
                                         (RSE)                             (RSE)               (RSE) 
 
Spoiler strategy                 2.056      .02          —                2.05        .024*          
                               (.32)                                                                     (.32)  
 
Motives 
  Regional Stability                                   —                            1.7        .11                         — 
                                                                   (.33) 
 
  Human Rights                                 —                             1.69        .38                       —  
                                                                                (.86)     
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Conclusion 
 The statistical results I report in Chapter 3 are striking to say the least, and 
validate the core argument of this thesis that peace enforcement operations are most 
successful when they utilize the appropriate spoiler management strategy and maintain 
impartiality and legitimacy through close cooperation with UN peacekeepers. When 
enforcement operations that meet these qualifications are present, my proportional hazard 
models predict the hazard ratio of civil war termination to be a whopping 318%—369% 
controlling for force capability. There are some serious limitations in this chapter that 
must be acknowledged: namely, the small number of covariates I include in my models 
and the skewed distribution of peace enforcement operations in the post-Cold-War era, 
and third party intervention in the Cold War era. I chose not to cut the dataset off in 1990 
because while the international system has changed significantly, most scholars agree the 
underlying dynamics of intrastate conflict have remained largely the same. 
 While these results in many ways speak for themselves, they tell us nothing about 
the causal mechanisms through which peace enforcement operations achieve success on a 
case-by-case basis. While I maintain that strategy, legitimacy, and impartiality are critical 
determinants of operational success, I must explore individual case studies in depth to test 
my more nuanced causal theory. In the chapters that follow, I explore four peace 
enforcement operations in three difficult cases. The first two cases, Sierra Leone and 
Afghanistan, lend themselves nicely to structured focused comparisons while the third is 
included primarily to illustrate the potential for short-term, light-footprint peace 
enforcement operations to contain potentially explosive regional violence.   
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Chapter IV 
Sierra Leone 
 In almost every way, the Sierra Leonean Civil War epitomizes conflict 
intractability. Every single environmental variable scholars cite as deterministic of 
peacekeeping failure and unsuccessful settlement implementation94 are present—deep-
seated hostility between belligerents, total spoilers, valuable commodities or spoils, a 
decimated national infrastructure, death and displacement on a massive scale, etc. As 
such, it is hardly surprising that peace in Sierra Leone was only achieved after ten years 
of intense war,  two major ‘episodes’ of peace enforcement, three peace 
agreements/ceasefires (two of which failed), and the deployment of one of the largest and 
most robust multidimensional UN peacekeeping missions to date. In my analysis, I find 
nearly all of my proposed causal mechanisms at work in a significant and noticeable way. 
Specifically, by comparing the UK and UNAMSIL’s successful enforcement operation 
with the other unsuccessful enforcement operation attempted by the Economic 
Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) earlier in the conflict, 
I demonstrate that cooperation and coordination problems between belligerents were only 
successfully resolved via the nexus between the use of an appropriate spoiler 
management strategy, actor legitimacy through UN involvement, and impartiality. 
 This chapter also allows me to justify a key component of my policy 
recommendations: that there is an ideal ‘recipe’ for the division of labor between UN and 
other actors in peace enforcement operations. Particularly visible in the relationship 
between the UK and UNAMSIL, the UN’s instrumental role in facilitating negotiations 
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and disarmament efforts while relying upon the UK to provide a credible security 
guarantee illustrates what I view as the ideal division of labor in peace enforcement 
operations. The UK’s close cooperation with the UN and eagerness to allow UNAMSIL 
to take the lead on a number of tasks will later be contrasted in Chapter 5 to the 
International Security Assistance Force’s overly ambitious attempt to enforce peace while 
simultaneously trying to coordinate tasks best delegated to neutral UN peacekeepers.  
 
Situational Factors 
 
 In terms of situational difficulty, there are few ways that Sierra Leone’s civil war 
could have been more problematic. While the conflict itself was catalyzed by external 
meddling emanating from the civil war in neighboring Liberia, nearly three decades of 
corruption, governmental degeneration, and one party rule provided Charles Taylor and 
Foday Sankoh with the fertile ground they needed to exploit Sierra Leone’s diamond 
riches through rebellion.95 After gaining independence from Britain in 1961, inept 
government and rampant unemployment enabled Foday Sankoh, a former army corporal, 
to organize disenfranchised Sierra Leoneans under the banner of the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF). Espousing an ideology of ‘democracy,’ Sankoh and his roughly 100 
followers received guerrilla warfare training in Libya before attacking Sierra Leone in 
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March of 1991 with help from Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and 
Burkinabe mercenaries. 96  
 When the civil war began, Sierra Leone was not only virtually stateless,97 but 
possessed a notoriously ill-trained, ill-equipped, and understaffed military.98 In the early 
months of the conflict, the Sierra Leonean Army (SLA), which numbered at around only 
3,000 troops, struggled to repel the RUF’s rapid advance into the country’s eastern 
diamond fields. Initiating an aggressive recruiting campaign that targeted children and 
criminals, the SLA was able to swell its ranks by over 10,000 recruits in the space of only 
a few months. Without training or military experience, however, these recruits proved 
even more incompetent than the original force. 99  Rather than turn the tide of the conflict 
in the government’s favor, vast numbers of SLA personnel collaborated with or defected 
to the RUF in the first year of the conflict. 100 This loose collaboration between the SLA 
and RUF would persist throughout the conflict, and culminate in the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC), a military junta, allying itself with the RUF in 1997 after 
taking control of the government in a coup.101 
 While the RUF professed political motives, studies suggest that the vast majority 
of its recruits were either abducted or motivated primarily by greed (via diamonds and 
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looting).102 It is no secret that the organization itself was primarily interested in the Kono 
district’s rich diamond mines, smuggling diamonds through Liberia and Burkina Fasso to 
fund itself and Charles Taylor’s NPFL in its war against the Liberian government.103 
Whenever peace talks or ceasefire agreements involved taking control of the diamond 
mines from the RUF, they would break away. Lansana Gberie describes the RUF’s 
behavior as “bandatism” and takes note of their primary focus on pillaging natural 
resources rather than attempting to topple the existing government.104 While the RUF’s 
leadership structure is somewhat ambiguous, RUF representatives involved in peace 
negotiations reportedly did not appear to be highly educated individuals.105 For the most 
part, the RUF’s tactics were incredibly brutal and most of their violence was directed 
against civilian populations. Swelling their ranks further with drugged-up, indoctrinated 
child soldiers, RUF recruits engaged in mass murders, rapes, and mutilations; later in the 
conflict their calling card became mass amputations—cutting off the hands of innocent 
civilians to discourage them from voting in democratic elections.106 Because of the 
RUF’s ties to Charles Taylor and his civil war in Liberia, the RUF received some 
international support from Libya, Cote D’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso.107  
 Over the course of the conflict, there were three major settlements/ceasefires that 
are important to note. The first was the Abidjan Agreement in 1996. After reaching a 
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military and political stalemate in 1995, another coup led to peace talks with the RUF and 
elections in March 1996.108 While Sankoh refused to recognize the elections, he met with 
the newly elected government and agreed to a ceasefire and demobilization in exchange 
for amnesty. As part of the agreement’s terms, a Neutral Monitoring Group was to 
observe implementation, but was never deployed because Sankoh refused to accept the 
proposed 750-person UN peacekeeping mission.109 Weeks later, fighting resumed and the 
accords collapsed as Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria and SLA and RUF soldiers fought 
for control of the diamond mines and other resources.110 The second was the Lome 
Agreement in 1999. After the introduction of ECOMOG, significant pressure from the 
US and UK led to a ceasefire in May 1999 and then to the Lome Peace Agreement on 
July 7. More comprehensive than Abidjan, Lome exonerated Sankoh from prison, gave 
him the status of vice president and control of strategic resources, made the RUF a 
political party, and provided a blanket amnesty for RUF, AFRC, Civil Defense Forces 
(CDF), and SLA combatants. Lome broke down after UNAMSIL (formerly UNOMSIL) 
positions were attacked by the RUF, several peacekeepers were killed and over 500 taken 
hostage, and captured UN equipment including armored personnel carriers used by the 
RUF to advance on Freetown.111 The third and only successful settlement was the Abuja 
Agreements. Signed after the United Kingdom and UNAMSIL militarily coerced the 
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RUF into the settlement, Abuja entailed extensive nationwide DDR and democratic 
elections in May and June 2002.112  
 Raw statistics give a good summary of both the intensity and complexity of Sierra 
Leone’s 10 year civil war. When Abuja was implemented the conflict was estimated to 
have killed over 70,000 civilians, displaced 2.5 million (half the country’s population), 
left 20,000 survivors of the conflict with RUF inflicted amputations, and involved over 
27,000 child soldiers.113 A state on the brink of collapse at the conflicts onset, Sierra 
Leone’s governmental and economic infrastructure was decimated by the war. GDP 
growth was negative until 2001, when it was only 3.8%.114 Summary statistics also tell 
the story of the force disparity between the RUF and SLA. At its peak, the RUF 
numbered at over 15,000 combatants while the SLA would only peak at around 14,000 
after aggressively recruiting children and criminals to swell its ranks. 115 In addition to 
crimes committed by the SLA, RUF, and AFRC junta, the Civil Defense Forces (a pro-
government paramilitary organization) committed vast numbers of atrocities and human 
rights abuses alongside ECOMOG. To date, the Special Court for Sierra Leone has 
attempted to hold some of these abusers accountable but has, for the most part, been only 
sporadically effective. Charles Taylor’s recent sentencing to 50 years in prison by the 
ICC does, however, give some hope for justice.  
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Before ECOMOG: Executive Outcomes 
 Before a regional attempt at peace enforcement was made by the Economic 
Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) between 1997 and 
1999, Executive Outcomes, a South African private military company (PMC) was 
contracted to support the SLA against the RUF. While Executive Outcomes’ (EO) 
involvement in the Sierra Leonean civil war cannot be classified as a peace enforcement 
operation per se, it begins to expose the RUF’s spoiling nature and adds credibility to my 
argument by further illustrating how counterbalancing military advantage and raising the 
cost of war can alter belligerent behavior. Additionally, EO’s inherently partial posture 
(considering it was directly contracted by the SLA to destroy the RUF) made it an 
unlikely candidate to equitably ‘enforce’ any type of settlement. Even if EO had stayed 
on after the Abidjan Agreement, it would not have been able to effectively help the SLA 
coordinate the DDR of the RUF without a significant impartial UN presence.  
 In 1992 amidst the SLA’s disastrous attempts to swell its ranks with children and 
criminals, consistent RUF gains provoked SLA Captain Valentine Strasser to oust the 
incompetent President Joseph Momoh in a coup and alter the government’s strategy by 
pursuing a dual-track political/military approach to resolving the conflict. Strasser did 
this by first requesting UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali facilitate a dialogue 
between his government and the RUF that would hopefully lead to national elections.116 
On the military front, rather than rely primarily on the incompetent SLA Strasser 
contracted Executive Outcomes (EO) to train Kamajors (local hunters who had organized 
to defend their villages from the RUF) and organize them into the Civil Defense Forces 
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(CDF), a paramilitary organization.117 Through 1996, the combined CDF/EO 
combination proved a more dangerous adversary to the RUF than the dysfunctional 
SLA.118 The division of labor in this relationship was strikingly efficient:  
EO served as a force multiplier for the Kamajors and leveraged their knowledge 
of the local jungle, which surpassed that of the more urban RUF, as well as the 
intelligence they were able to gather from the local population. Using 
counterinsurgency tactics they employed under the SAFD [South African 
Defense Forces], EO efficiently secured Freetown, regained control of the 
diamond mines, destroyed the RUF headquarters and cleared areas of RUF 
occupation in a series of five major offensives from May 1995 to October 
1996.119 
 
In the aftermath of these offensives, a weakened RUF signaled its willingness to 
negotiate and sign a peace agreement with the government in November 1996.120 
However at Sankoh’s request and in response to international pressure, a clause was 
written into the agreement that dictated all foreign militaries (and PMCs) had to leave the 
country.121 After the significant gains EO and the Kamajors made against the RUF, the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (a group of renegade SLA officers) staged a coup 
within 100 days of EO’s departure (as EO’s intelligence had predicted) and allied itself 
with the RUF. Ousting the recently elected Joseph Kabbah, the AFRC/RUF proceeded to 
reclaim all of the territory it had previously lost to the EO-reinforced Civil Defense 
Forces.122 
 Militarily, there are few differences between Executive Outcomes’ involvement in 
Sierra Leone, and the United Kingdom’s successful involvement four years later. 
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Composed of 80-350 soldiers drawn from elite units in the SADF, EO’s force in Sierra 
Leone had extensive counterinsurgency training and excellent unit cohesion that enabled 
it to utilize a flexible and aggressive military strategy.123 High morale and discipline 
allowed EO to remain credible throughout the operation by decisively projecting force 
against the RUF. By taking the diamond mines from Sankoh, the primary source of 
wealth fuelling his rebellion, EO’s involvement significantly altered the RUF’s 
cost/benefit calculus by exponentially raising the cost of continuing hostilities. Standing 
to gain more from negotiation than hostilities, Sankoh ingeniously made his compliance 
with the Abidjan Agreement contingent upon EO’s departure. Never intending to actually 
abide by the agreement, Sankoh simply waited out EO’s departure and the AFRC’s coup 
while resisting the deployment of a UN-led Neutral Monitoring Group (NMG) to oversee 
DDR and ensure the RUF’s compliance with Abidjan.124 This illustrates the first of two 
occasions in the Sierra Leonean Civil War in which inducement, or giving a spoiler what 
it wants, was improperly utilized as a strategy for managing a greedy spoiler.  
 Motivated solely by continued access to the diamond fields, Sankoh had no real 
interest in transforming the RUF into a political party under the Abidjan Agreement, or 
pursuing any real political goals for that matter—essentially casting the RUF as greedy 
spoiler whose decisions changed based upon calculations of cost and risk. Without EO or 
the proposed NMG (a security guarantee), the SLA and CDF’s weakness relative to the 
RUF (disequilibrium) was an open invitation (incentive) for backstabbing. In essence, the 
Abidjan Agreement was plagued by all six of the problems Stedman and Rothchild cite as 
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impediments to settlement implementation: vague and expedient agreements, a lack of 
coordination between mediators and implementers, lack of coordination among 
implementing agencies, the incomplete fulfillment of mandated tasks, a short time 
horizon and limited commitment of implementers, and the presence of spoilers.125 The 
AFRC’s coup aside, Kabbah made a serious mistake in choosing to utilize Stedman’s 
strategy of inducement with a greedy, bordering on total, spoiler. Rather, with the RUF 
cut off from its main source of funding, Kabbah theoretically could have used EO and the 
CDF to follow through with a coercive strategy that would have brought the RUF to the 
negotiating table and demanded a strong, neutral implementation force be provided to 
oversee the agreement’s implementation and deter the RUF from taking advantage of the 
settlement.  
 While EO’s intervention was successful overall, the RUF at the time was only 
composed of a few thousand rebels, mostly ‘situational opportunists’ and around 350 
‘hardcore’ fighters.126 After EO’s departure, the RUF swelled to upwards of 35,000 
soldiers (including 4,500 child solders). This in some ways allows for a downplaying of 
EO’s role in the conflict by claiming it had a significant military advantage at the time.127 
Before ECOMOG’s deployment, the AFRC Junta’s split from the SLA would create even 
more anti-government forces and a now-rogue Civil Defense Force. Additionally, EO’s 
relentlessly offensive tactics were made possible by its use of premium close air support, 
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namely recently purchased Soviet Mi-8, Mi-17, and Mi-24 helicopters, night vision, 
napalm, and cluster bombs.128 
  
ECOMOG: Attempted Peace Enforcement  
 The first true attempt at peace enforcement in Sierra Leone came in the form of 
Nigerian intervention through ECOMOG, or the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) Ceasefire Monitoring Group. At the conflict’s onset, ECOMOG 
troops were already deployed in the region to support Liberian President Samuel Doe’s 
regime against Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Because 
Sierra Leone was a troop contributor to ECOMOG and served as a logistical support base 
for its mission in Liberia, ECOWAS inevitably felt some responsibility to treat Sierra 
Leone as a second front of the Liberian Civil War. When the RUF made its first advances 
in the southeast, however, ECOWAS forces were bogged down fighting the NPFL in 
Liberia and could not immediately organize an ECOMOG-type mission to help then-
President Momoh curtail the RUF’s rapid advance.129  
 Meanwhile, as discussed previously, the government contracted Executive 
Operations for upwards of $35 million over the course of 21 months— between 1995 and 
implementation of the Abidjan Agreement in January 1996.130 As Executive Outcomes 
departed, and in the midst of elections, the RUF stepped up its brutal aggression against 
the civilian population by hacking off limbs and dumping them in bags at the doorsteps 
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of government buildings—a revolting reference to Kabbah’s campaign slogan, ‘the future 
is in your hands.’131 Months after Kabbah’s victory, all of EO and the CDF’s progress 
was undone as the renegade AFRC junta overthrew Kabbah and allied itself with the 
RUF in May 1997. While Nigeria initially attempted to use unilateral military force (as it 
had some troops already stationed in Sierra Leone) to reinstate Kabbah, that effort failed 
to reverse the coup and Nigerian President Sani Abacha transitioned to shuttle diplomacy 
to cultivate support for a full scale intervention.132 In June, ECOWAS finally recognized 
the direness of the situation in Sierra Leone and at the Organization for African Unity’s 
request moved to redirect ECOMOG units from Liberia to liberate Freetown, Sierra 
Leone’s capital, from the RUF and coerce a new settlement. In the six months following 
ECOMOG’s initial deployment, ECOMOG would fail to change the status quo in any 
significant way. Finally deciding to contract Sandline International, a British PMC, to 
assist ECOMOG in early 1998, progress against the RUF was resumed until ECOMOG 
departed in 1999 after the Lome Peace Agreement was ratified and the UN Assistance 
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was deployed in ECOMOG’s place.  
 While ECOMOG was deployed to Sierra Leone under the guise of ECOWAS, it 
was in many respects a “single state” enforcement mission since all but 1,000 of 
ECOMOG’s 13,000 troops were Nigerian.133 Led by Sani Abacha, a military dictator, 
Nigeria had the unique political will necessary to stomach a large-scale enforcement 
mission with heavy casualties. While ECOWAS’ intervention in Sierra Leone was 
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endorsed by the President of the UN Security Council,134 Nigeria’s motives in the 
intervention were questionable. Since ECOWAS’ inception in 1975 Nigeria had used the 
organization as a vehicle for pursing its diplomatic and economic interests and 
maintaining regional hegemony.135 Because of this, it is likely that Nigeria’s overtly 
dominant role in ECOMOG reflected hegemonic and material motivations rather than 
humanitarian motives. This self-interested approach to the enforcement operation 
inevitably precipitated Nigerian tension with Ghana and Guinea, the other two nations 
contributing troops to the operation, and manifest as poor leadership and limited military 
cooperation.136 Furthermore, although ECOWAS authorized the mission, the coalition did 
not contribute meaningfully to the planning or even authorization of the mission itself.137  
 ECOMOG’s military failure was attributable to a variety of factors: exceedingly 
poor command and control and a lack of cooperation between Nigerian, Ghanaian, and 
Guinean battalions resulted in incompetence, corruption, poor coordination, almost no 
intelligence sharing, and an overall disunity of effort.138 This was most apparent in the 
RUF’s surprise attack on Freetown despite optimistic security reports—which 
legitimately surprised both ECOMOG and the United Nations who were assumed to be at 
the very least attempting to monitor RUF movements. The deployment of Nigerian troops 
alongside questionably loyal SLA units that included rebel elements or sympathizers 
further sabotaged ECOMOG operations and often allowed the RUF to stay one step 
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ahead of ECOMOG’s activities.139 Nigerian Major General Maxwell Khobe, the leader of 
the force, often complained that his forces lacked the appropriate military equipment to 
successfully engage in counterinsurgency operations against the RUF on unfamiliar 
terrain.  
 These issues adversely affected morale and discipline throughout the operation 
and ultimately resulted in ECOMOG failing to successfully implement the UN’s 
embargoes and sanctions. Lacking the capacity to secure Sierra Leone’s ports and border 
with Liberia, diamond and arms smuggling continued to feed the rebellion.140 Despite 
Sandline International’s involvement (a British PMC) in training and advising Nigerian 
units, there were few improvements in their conduct and professionalism over time. The 
DDR process was also inhibited by a lack of funding and low participation.141 Nigeria’s 
questionable motives and operational disorganization together with the sloppy conduct of 
ECOMOG’s operations, which often involved gross human rights abuses and summary 
executions, ultimately eroded ECOMOG’s legitimacy and complicated its relationship 
with the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL, UNAMSIL’s predecessor, 
which at the time consisted of a very small contingent of 50 observers to monitor the 
security situation and DDR efforts).  
 Tracing the course of ECOMOG’s enforcement mission, it is easy to see how 
these operational shortcomings compounded with the contingent’s lack of 
professionalism and in the end failed to successfully coerce the RUF into cooperating 
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with the UN’s diplomatic initiatives. In June 1997, seven days after the AFRC junta 
deposed Kabbah and allied itself with the RUF, Nigeria’s small ECOMOG contingent 
based in Sierra Leone unsuccessfully attempted to retake Freetown in Operation 
Sandstorm. Insufficient logistical support and insecure communications allowed the junta 
to receive advanced warning of the attack and induce heavy casualties on the Nigerians. 
After the new ECOMOG Task Force was approved, a second assault was launched on 
rebel-held Freetown in February 1998. Unwilling to incur the same cost, Nigerian forces 
shelled Freetown for several days before the offensive and caused more harm to civilians 
than to the RUF.142 In 1999, when the RUF launched a surprise assault on Freetown 
(Operation no living thing), more than 5,000 civilians were killed by forces on both sides, 
150,000 residents displaced, and 2,000 children abducted by the RUF.143 Massacring 
civilians and burning buildings throughout the capital, the RUF nearly drove ECOMOG 
out of Freetown before ECOMOG hastily launched a counterattack that entailed 
undisciplined Nigerian soldiers torturing, raping, and summarily executing anyone 
remotely suspected of being involved with the AFRC/RUF.144 In the countryside, 
corruption among ECOMOG forces sometimes resulted in corroboration with the RUF 
and the trading of supplies for diamonds, but never to the same degree as the SLA. The 
Nigerian Operation ‘Death Before Dishonor’ was criticized by many for its serious 
human rights abuses.145 Nigeria’s near defeat at Freetown and Nigerian President 
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Abacha’s sudden death in 1998 ultimately resulted in Nigeria’s new democratic 
government demanding the country’s 12,000 troops be withdrawn from Sierra Leone.146 
 Scrambling to fill the void, the UN, UK, and ECOWAS pushed the reinstated 
Kabbah to reach a peace deal with the AFRC/RUF. Negotiations ultimately led to a 
ceasefire in May 1999 and the Lome Peace Agreements on July 7.147 Under Lome, 
Sankoh was transferred from Nigerian death row to the Deux Fevrier Hotel in Lome, a 
blanket amnesty was given to all combatants, and Sankoh was appointed vice president of 
the country. As ECOMOG departed UNOMSIL was transformed into a larger and more 
robust peacekeeping mission called the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). 
Deploying 6,000 peacekeepers in 1999 to take ECOMOG’s place and implement Lome, 
UNAMSIL would quickly run into serious trouble only a year later when its attempts to 
access the diamond mining areas would be repelled by the RUF and ignite a new cycle of 
violence that would result in Lome’s failure.148 
 ECOMOG’s failure has a little to do with the increased situational difficulty after 
EO’s departure, and a lot to do with the contingent’s lack of tact. Intervening several 
months after Executive Outcomes’ departure, ECOMOG faced a significantly larger, 
more experienced, and better armed RUF. Poor strategy, a disunity of effort, questionable 
motives, and a lack of legitimacy ultimately led to ECOMOG’s failure to coerce the RUF 
to the negotiating table or successfully implement the UN’s embargos or sanctions. While 
the operation was successful at driving the AFRC from Freetown and reinstalling 
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Kabbah, rampant human rights abuses and an inability to capture the RUF controlled 
diamond fields failed to significantly alter the rebels’ cost benefit calculus. Now facing 
more rebel groups, including the AFRC, West Side Boys, CDF, and breakaway elements 
of the SLA, ill-equipped ECOMOG units were never able to gain any real military 
advantage over belligerents without helicopters, sufficient armored vehicles, training, 
intelligence, or strategy. In the end, ECOMOG made the same strategic mistake Kabbah 
did years earlier: it failed to follow through with a coercive spoiler management strategy 
and instead pushed the government to appease, or induce, the rebels at its departure. 
While ECOMOG did maintain some degree of impartiality, as evident by its willingness 
to see Kabbah make peace with the rebels, its shortcomings never allowed it to fulfill its 
mandated responsibilities, or establish itself as a credible or legitimate force. The DDR 
initiative it had been charged with managing was only sporadically successful and 
disarmed barely 3,000 combatants in 1998.149  Although ECOMOG did not stick around 
long enough to implement Lome, it is likely that its soldiers’ poor discipline and lack of 
professionalism would have resulted in collusion and seriously threatened 
implementation efforts.  
 
UNAMSIL and the United Kingdom: Successful Peace Enforcement  
 As ECOMOG pulled out, UNAMSIL deployed a force of 6,000 peacekeepers to 
oversee the terms of the Lome Agreement. Its ranks initially consisted of 3,000 
Nigerians, 2,000 Indians, 1,000 Guineans, and 15 unarmed British military observers.150 
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While UNAMSIL was technically a peace enforcement mission authorized under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, it did not deploy with enough personnel or equipment to provide a 
credible security guarantee or ensure that noncooperation with Lome would be punished 
with force.151 Almost inevitably, as UNAMSIL attempted to deploy into the RUF 
controlled diamond fields, RUF forces began attacking UNAMSIL’s positions. Around 
the time Lome was ratified, a split occurred within the RUF as forces loyal to Sam 
Brokerie engaged both RUF troops loyal to Sankoh and UNAMSIL.152  Increasing its 
presence from 6,000 to 11,000 personnel, incidents between the RUF and UNAMSIL 
increased steadily in 2000. Embarrassing run-ins with the RUF involved the kidnapping 
of hundreds of peacekeepers, the seizure of massive amounts of UN weapons and 
ammunition, and the use of UNAMSIL uniforms to lure other UN troops into 
ambushes.153 Several including UNAMSIL’s commander would criticize Resolution 
1270 as being weak and ambiguous on UNAMSIL’s ability to use force against the 
RUF.154 On May 5, 2000, however, the RUF’s brazen ambush and capture of 208 
Zambian peacekeepers and their 25 armored personnel carriers (APCs)—and subsequent 
use of these vehicles to attack Freetown— triggered a British intervention. 
 As the RUF once again advanced on Freetown with its newly captured APCs and 
UN supplies, the British launched Operation Palliser: the second enforcement mission I 
assess in this chapter. Although Palliser initially began as an ‘evacuation mission’ for 
British citizens and EU nationals in Freetown, the deployment of its rapid reactionary 
force brought about an immediate change on the ground. While Kofi Annan had initially 
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requested the US, France, and UK bolster UNAMSIL, the British were the ones to 
ultimately respond to their ex-colony’s woes and entered Sierra Leone knowing the scope 
of their mission would be ambiguous once their evacuation mission was complete.155 
Within 24 hours of agreeing to the operation, Britain’s Operation Liaison and 
Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) had deployed to Sierra Leone, followed by more than 600 
Royal Marine Commandos and paratroopers equipped with attack helicopters and Sea 
Harriers only a few days later.156 While the international media questioned the scope of 
Britain’s operation, British SAS forces were carrying out operations well beyond 
Freetown by May 9 as British forces dug in alongside UNAMSIL to defend Freetown 
from an impending RUF offensive.  
 As the British began engaging the RUF for the first time, British forces proved to 
be surprisingly impartial in their interactions with hostile RUF units. British units 
typically left rebel elements alone but, when attacked, decimated the RUF with 
overwhelming firepower and air support: often without a single British casualty.157 A 
string of British victories ‘persuaded’ Koroma, head of the AFRC junta, and the Civil 
Defense Forces to switch allegiances and join the British/UNAMSIL in fighting the RUF. 
When Operation Palliser concluded, the British withdrew the majority of their forces, but 
maintained a formidable presence in the country and offshore to train the SLA and 
discourage the rebels from taking advantage of UNAMSIL. Special Forces units also 
assisted UNAMSIL in rescuing peacekeepers held hostage by the RUF in Operation 
Basilica, Khukri, and Barras. By September 2000, Sankoh had been captured and 
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imprisoned, Guinea deployed its military alongside UNAMSIL to increase pressure on 
the RUF, and Taylor was forced to cut (read curtail) his support for the RUF.158 By 
November, a militarily and politically weakened RUF signed the Abuja agreements and 
UNAMSIL began to focus more on settlement implementation while capitalizing upon 
the perception that it was still backed in full by British forces. 
 While it is undeniable that Britain’s rapid deployment of Special Forces troops to 
support UNAMSIL ‘shocked and awed’ the RUF and AFRC junta, this is only one factor 
that contributed to the operation’s overall success and UNAMSIL’s successful 
implementation of Abidjan. Unable to deploy in support of a Nigerian-dominated 
ECOMOG for political reasons related to Abacha’s poor human rights record, UNAMSIL 
provided the neutral foundation Britain needed to launch a temporary, low-risk peace 
enforcement operation. While UNAMSIL had the impartiality and international 
credibility it required to successfully implement Lome, it was unable to legitimize itself 
on the ground as the RUF and AFRC junta reneged, attacked, and humiliated its 
peacekeepers on several occasions. On top of RUF attacks against peacekeepers, David 
Keen and Virginia Fortna describe a ‘spiral of mistrust’ between the RUF and 
government-allied Civil Defense Forces as primarily responsible for the failure of the 
Abidjan Agreement:  
 
Progovernment forces’ fear of an RUF offensive lead to preemptive Kamajor 
[CDF] attacks against RUF bases…The RUF stepped up its own attacks in 
response. Sankoh explained that Kamajor attacks after Abidjan proved that the 
government was not ready for peace, “so we prepared for the worst.” Without 
peacekeepers [or peace enforcers] present, “It was hard to rein in the Kamajors or 
to reassure RUF combatants, in particular, about their future safety.” Similarly, 
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while the RUF’s aggressive intentions certainly played a role…RUF combatants 
were afraid to disarm without the CDF being disarmed as well.159 
 
 Britain’s enforcement operation provided UNAMSIL with the firepower it needed to 
radically alter the rebel’s strategic calculus, exemplified in the AFRC junta and CDF’s 
decision to switch sides in the early stages of British intervention. The AFRC and then-
renegade CDF, which can be classified as strictly opportunistic greedy spoilers, were 
quickly pacified through a strategy of socialization and coercion—changing the behavior 
of the spoiler to adhere to a set of norms. The RUF, however, a greedy/total spoiler, was 
necessarily coerced by the British until it no longer possessed the capacity or will to 
undermine the peace process. As Abuja was implemented and the RUF resisted some of 
its implications, British forces held a number of high-profile military exercises to 
demonstrate their support for UNAMSIL and play off of the RUF’s newfound fear of 
British firepower. Tony Blair demonstrated that even with a small contingent offshore, 
the British had the political will to respond with overwhelming force if UNAMSIL’s 
weakness was taken advantage of.  
 With British help, UNAMSIL was able to refine its strategy and capabilities by 
utilizing satellite imagery and intelligence, and bringing in helicopter gunships for 
additional firepower.160 The SLA, previously incompetent and questionably legitimate, 
was trained and advised by the British so it could better support UNAMSIL. In some 
instances, British officers even wore the SLA uniform and operated directly within the 
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SLA’s command structure.161 Helping UNAMSIL create a safe and secure environment, 
the cornerstone of effective counterinsurgency strategy, the British scaled back their role 
relatively quickly while conducting a number of high-profile military exercises in Sierra 
Leone to remind the RUF of their presence. When UNAMSIL did run into trouble, or 
attempted complex hostage rescue operations, the SAS was more than willing to follow 
through with enhancing their firepower through direct UK participation. In short, the 
UK’s expertise in counterinsurgency had not existed in Sierra Leone since Executive 
Outcomes’ departure several years earlier. 
 Providing security for DDR initiatives early on before withdrawing most of its 
forces, the UK created the momentum UNAMSIL needed to be successful in settlement 
implementation. Increasing its troop presence to 17,500, UNAMSIL was finally able to 
provide a credible security guarantee by forcefully punishing would-be spoilers of 
Abidjan. As a highly professional and disciplined force, in stark contrast to ECOMOG, 
the British were viewed as both legitimate and credible by other actors in the conflict. 
Able to pursue their objectives with overwhelming force and decision, the AFRC junta, 
CDF, and fractured elements of the RUF responded to Britain’s decisive strategy by 
switching sides so as to avoid being targeted (responding to the relative benefit of peace 
and high cost of continuing hostilities). Possibly most importantly, the British remained 
impartial throughout their involvement, actively choosing to accept the surrender of these 
units rather than seek their outright extermination. Working alongside the UN and 
welcoming belligerents who wanted to change allegiances, the British very clearly 
demonstrated their impartial humanitarian approach to the conflict and avoided making 
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the fragmented rebels view the conflict as an ‘all or nothing’ affair ending in either 
victory or death.  
 A counterargument can be made here that a coercive spoiler management strategy 
was only effective because the RUF was motivated primarily by greed rather than a 
radical ideology—thereby making it a rational ‘greedy’ spoiler sensitive to cost-benefit 
calculations rather than a total spoiler with inflexible, immutable goals. While this 
criticism is indeed warranted, the number of belligerents in the history of intrastate war 
motivated purely by a radical ideology is negligible. As I demonstrate in the next chapter, 
even the Taliban, an organization popularly perceived to be driven by a ‘radical Islamist 
ideology’ is composed primarily of cash-strapped farmers and an inconsequential number 
of hardline al Qaeda fighters. If anything, the Taliban are significantly more attentive to 
cost-benefit calculations than members of the RUF, who were for the most part drugged-
up, abducted children or young adults.  
 Britain’s peace enforcement operation, which peaked at only 750 personnel, 
provided UNAMSIL with the force it needed to change the rebels’ cost/benefit calculus, 
and effectively implement Abidjan by swiftly punishing noncooperation and attempts at 
backstabbing. Dramatically raising the cost of continuing hostilities, Britain followed 
through with its operation into the implementation phase (as ECOMOG did not) by 
creating momentum for UNAMSIL’s ultimate supervision and coordination of the DDR 
process. However, critical tasks such as DDR and policing were left to the United 
Nations who was viewed as the most impartial and legitimate actor in the conflict. While 
the UK did take the lead in security sector reform within the SLA, it did not attempt to 
micromanage peace-building efforts by any means—leaving most of these tasks to the 
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UN. This division of labor is in essence the perfect ‘recipe’ for the delegation of tasks to 
the UN and non-UN enforcement elements in peace enforcement operations. 
 When belligerent elements attempted to spoil Abidjan, the British demonstrated 
their willingness to redeploy themselves at a moment’s notice—thereby making reneging 
outright deadly. Maintaining its impartiality and legitimacy by working alongside the UN 
and using coercive force against any and all spoilers to the agreement, the British 
provided the impartial security guarantee necessary for both progovernment forces (the 
CDF) and anti-government forces (the RUF, West Side Boys, etc.) to disarm without risk. 
Even the RUF, the primary antagonist in the conflict, was allowed to continue to exist as 
a political party in the next election—further demonstrating the UK and UNAMSIL’s 
steadfast commitment to neutrality and impartiality. This impartial posture prevented 
RUF combatants from seeing the conflict as a ‘victory or death’ affair.  
 In the long term, UNAMSIL’s continued presence into 2005 helped ensure peace 
did not fail after the UK’s departure. To this day (March 2013), the UN Integrated 
Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone continues to ensure Abidjan’s longevity while 
promoting economic and democratic growth in the country.  
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Chapter V 
Afghanistan 
  
Much like Sierra Leone, Afghanistan’s more than 30-year long civil war is a case study in 
conflict intractability. Inhabited by ethnically and linguistically diverse tribes living 
amidst billions of dollars’ worth of poppy (opium), Afghanistan has suffered from 
decades of brutal civil war, governmental degeneration, and superpower meddling. While 
the Afghan Civil War has been ongoing since 1978, the most recent phase of the conflict 
that began in 2001 is the primary focus of this chapter. 
 Afghanistan demonstrates how peace enforcement operations can, without the 
appropriate spoiler management strategy and UN cooperation, exacerbate rather than 
mitigate belligerents’ perception they must fight for ‘all or nothing’ in a conflict. 
Analyzing the failed attempt by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to make and enforce peace in Afghanistan post-
2001, I argue that a series of strategic and political errors ultimately prevented ISAF and 
OEF from making and implementing peace through the causal mechanisms of peace 
enforcement success I propose. Specifically, by tracing ISAF and OEF’s involvement in 
the conflict, I demonstrate that cooperation and coordination problems between 
belligerents were exacerbated by the peace enforcement operation’s targeting of limited 
spoilers with coercive force and an overall failure to maintain impartiality and legitimacy 
without the support of UN peacekeepers. Rather than delegate delicate post-conflict 
stabilization tasks requiring extreme impartiality to the United Nations, ISAF and OEF 
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attempted to play the role of both peace enforcer and peacekeeper by launching their own 
unsuccessful peacebuilding initiatives. 
 While Afghanistan is arguably the most situationally difficult case I explore, 
ISAF and OEF oversaw more than four years of relative peace and stability between the 
ousting of the Taliban in 2001 and the Taliban insurgency’s escalation in mid-2006. 
Despite its initial success, OEF’s persistent targeting of the Taliban with unwarranted 
coercive force in the aftermath of the 2001 invasion radicalized and galvanized, rather 
than pacified, Taliban and Haqqani fighters. Snubbing sincere attempts by the Taliban to 
negotiate for peace, the OEF and ISAF turned the Taliban from moderate limited spoilers 
into a deadly mix of internationally-funded total and greedy spoilers with nearly 
immutable goals. While ISAF and OEF were only recently unified under the same 
command structure in the late 2000s and legally distinct entities for much of the 2001-
2006 period, I consider them together as one peace enforcement operation in my analysis. 
This is partly due to the fact that both have been normatively linked to the Bonn 
Agreement (discussed below) and the Afghan Central Government for the duration of 
their deployment. 
 
Situational Factors 
 Comparable in many ways to the Sierra Leonean Civil War, Afghanistan’s civil 
war was fueled by external meddling, decades of corruption, nepotism and governmental 
disintegration, rampant poverty, and economic stagnation. For most of the country’s 
history, the vast majority of Afghans have relied upon subsistence farming for survival, 
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and traditional tribal societies for law and order—creating constant tension between rural 
Afghans and attempts to unify the country under centralized state institutions.162   
 This longstanding disconnect between Kabul, the capital city, and the traditional 
values and customs of rural Afghans drove Islamist resistance movements emanating 
from the countryside to violently oppose attempts by the communist People’s Democratic 
Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) to modernize the country in 1978. By 1979, infighting 
within the PDPA and rapid gains by the Islamist insurgency placed Afghanistan at the 
brink of state collapse. Seeking to support its client, the PDPA, and avoid a regional 
crisis, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December of 1979—ultimately 
galvanizing the Islamist resistance movement and internationalizing the conflict. In 
response, dozens of countries including the United States began funneling arms to 
Islamist guerrillas known as the mujahideen. This influx of international military support 
enabled the mujahideen to consolidate their political and military position in the conflict, 
and attracted powerful non-state international backers with their own lofty political and 
religious agendas.163 
 As the conflict progressed, the mujahideen’s struggle against the Soviet Union 
attracted the attention of powerful Islamist leaders and regional powers jockeying for 
military advantage in the region. Characterizing the mujahideen’s struggle as a jihad, or 
religious crusade, competing sponsors caused the mujahideen to split into rival factions—
some of which sought to create a pure Islamist state based upon a strict interpretation of 
Islamic religious law known as Sharia law or Wahhabism. Sustained by millions of 
dollars in foreign military aid channeled through Pakistan’s military intelligence agency, 
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the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the mujahideen fought a brutal war of attrition 
against the Soviet Union and its client, the PDPA, for nearly a decade.164 
 In a half-hearted attempt to craft peace, the US and USSR signed the Geneva 
Accords in 1982 pledging the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces in exchange for the 
disengagement of the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from the conflict. 
Despite this, both sides continued supporting their clients in the conflict even after the 
Soviets began withdrawing in 1985.165 After the Soviet withdrawal was completed in 
1989, Afghanistan’s PDPA-controlled central government finally folded to the 
Mujahideen in April 1992. In the violent chaos that ensued, the country was divided up 
along regional and ethnic lines as rival mujahideen factions controlling seven different 
semiautonomous regions authored a new, more brutal chapter in Afghanistan’s civil 
war.166  
 With each rival group sustained by a different international backer— from Russia 
and Iran to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia—regional powers were unable to reach consensus 
on how to end the conflict and continued to actively undermine each other’s efforts at the 
expense of the Afghan people.167 In 1994, Pakistan’s ISI established the Afghan Taliban 
(Quetta Shura Taliban) in an attempt to resolve the ongoing violence in southern 
Afghanistan.168 Within two years, the highly disciplined and well-armed Taliban 
successfully wrest control of the vast majority of the country from competing mujahideen 
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factions, and began implementing their own extreme version of Wahhabism 
nationwide.169 
 In 1996, Osama Bin Laden’s expulsion from Sudan brought him back to 
Afghanistan where he had initially fought alongside and funded the Taliban’s attempts to 
consolidate their control over the country.170 From 1996 onwards, Bin Laden slowly but 
steadily built his floundering terrorist network, al Qaeda, into a full-fledged terrorist 
organization. Through al Qaeda’s 1998 embassy bombings and into 2001, al Qaeda’s 
leadership became increasingly intertwined with that of the Taliban who continued to 
attract powerful international donors and political sponsors.171 Immediately prior to the 
US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in October 2001, the Taliban controlled 
approximately 75 percent of Afghanistan’s territory.172 The remainder was controlled by 
the United National Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (hereafter the 
“Northern Alliance”), and other political and military groups that had previously fought 
one another during the period of intense warfare between 1992 and 1996. For the most 
part, these factionalized groups existed under decentralized leadership structures “which 
in pre-war years rested largely on the structures of customary institutions (tribal and 
religious), by 2001 rested on control of military and financial resources generated by 
participation in the conflict and the war economy.”173 
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Operation Enduring Freedom and the Ousting of the Taliban  
 While the first stage of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was not in and of 
itself a peace enforcement operation, it was in many ways an attempt to change the status 
quo in Afghanistan’s ongoing civil war. Twenty-six days after the September 11th 
terrorist attacks, the United States launched OEF against al Qaeda and its Taliban 
protectors with the intention of depriving al Qaeda of hiding places and sources of 
support by “accelerating the transition of the world’s more politically problematic corners 
towards a democratic capitalist future.”174 Severely miscalculating the likely US reaction 
if its demands to turn Osama Bin Laden over were not met—and basing its predictions 
upon the limited US response to the 1998 embassy bombings—the Taliban’s leader 
Mullah Omar presented the US with the same offer he had made in 1998: to turn Bin 
Laden over to another Islamic country for trial in a multinational Islamic court. Claiming 
to regard the protection of a guest as a serious religious and cultural duty, the Taliban 
perceived their standing in the Islamic world as riding upon them resisting US demands 
about Bin Laden. Solidifying their position even further were repeated assurances from 
the Taliban’s primary ally, Pakistan, that it would support the regime in the event that the 
US followed through with its threats.175  
 At the time of the invasion, the United States derived OEF’s mandate primarily 
from Article 51 of the UN Charter, which explicitly recognized a state’s right to use 
military force in self-defense.176 Choosing to dislodge the Taliban as quickly as possible 
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without first considering the long-term consequences, 177 the Bush Administration 
decided that despite the Taliban’s offer to extradite Bin Laden to a multinational Islamic 
court, a friendly regime in Kabul was needed to create the conditions under which US 
forces could battle and search for al Qaeda activists in Afghanistan.178 Initially, Taliban 
and al Qaeda air defenses, bases, command and control facilities, and training camps 
were targeted by American air power, followed by “targets of opportunity” such as 
military vehicles and defense emplacements around major cities.179 Afterwards, UK and 
US Special Forces and CIA paramilitary teams embedded themselves in Northern 
Alliance militias to advise and coordinate attacks against Taliban positions with close US 
air support. By November 12, 2001, US-backed Northern Alliance forces controlled 
roughly 70 percent of Afghanistan including Kabul.180   
 The haste with which Enduring Freedom was carried out allowed most of al 
Qaeda and the Taliban’s top leadership, including Bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah 
Omar, to escape from Afghanistan into Pakistan.181 This allowed the Afghan Taliban and 
Haqqani network to remain potentially formidable belligerents in the conflict despite 
their initial military defeat and subsequent exile. Between 2001 and 2006, the Taliban 
would successfully rearm and restructure their organization in preparation for the 
prolonged insurgency that lay ahead. In the early stages of their regrouping, from 2001 to 
2003, the Taliban utilized its historically strong ties with Jamiat-e-Ulema, the Pakistani 
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military, ISI, and various extremist groups based in Pakistan’s border region to obtain the 
weapons and supplies it needed for the insurgency while establishing a secure area of 
operational retreat.182 Taking advantage of the Pakistani perception that US involvement 
in Afghanistan would be brief and limited, the ISI and military were convinced by 
Mullah Omar of the Taliban’s continued utility as an instrument of Pakistani foreign 
policy—previously administering a pro-Pakistani government in Afghanistan that 
provided Pakistan with strategic depth while pacifying secessionist movements in its 
border regions.183  
 Simultaneous with their transfer of weapons, ammunition, food, and supplies to 
preexisting stockpiles in Afghanistan, the Taliban leadership focused upon funding their 
insurgency by soliciting domestic and international donations from sympathizers in Saudi 
Arabia and within the Pakistani military and intelligence ranks.184 The flourishing of 
Afghanistan’s drug trade two years after the toppling of the Taliban regime would 
provide millions if not billions of additional dollars in opium revenue to the Taliban and 
al Qaeda over a five year period. These funds would later enable the Taliban to increase 
the financial incentives they could offer participants in their insurgency,185 and take 
advantage of the US-backed central government’s failure to provide economic 
reconstruction and security to the population by creating ‘shadow’ governments and 
governors in several provinces.186 
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 While the political and strategic moves the Taliban made to rearm their 
organization are of little relevance to my argument overall, they are important to keep in 
mind as I discuss the US and ISAF’s strategic and political failures below. Misperceiving 
the Taliban and Haqqani as a ‘spent force,’ American pressure to exclude the Taliban and 
others from the Bonn Agreement and subsequent transitional government would 
ultimately drive the organization’s exiled leadership from attempts at peace, to 
rearmament and the adoption of a ruthless insurgency strategy in 2006. 
 
The Bonn Agreement, the US, and ISAF 
 Before the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was formally 
established in December 2001, important political and military developments began 
sowing the seeds for ISAF and OEF’s ultimate failure. After Kabul fell to the Northern 
Alliance in 2001, a diplomatic scramble began to politically organize Afghanistan’s non-
Taliban political leadership into a coherent centralized government. Flush with US 
funding, arms, and training from OEF’s initial push to topple the Taliban, the same 
factional armies that had fought one another between 1992 and 1996 were quick to 
reclaim the regional territories they had lost to the Taliban five years prior. On top of this 
potentially explosive situation, the US was forced to shape its own political goals in 
Afghanistan around UN Security Council Resolution 1378 which called for a “central” 
UN role in establishing a transitional administration, and invited member states to send 
peacekeeping forces to promote stability and secure the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance.187 Also calling for a new government that would be “broad-based, multi-
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ethnic and fully representative of all the Afghan people,”188 1378 laid the foundation for 
the deployment of a multinational security force to create the “political space” needed in 
Kabul to prevent factional violence and allow for the creation of such a diverse 
representative government.189 
 While the Northern Alliance, who was in complete control of Kabul at the time, 
swiftly rejected the proposal for a neutral security force, the US and UN successfully 
persuaded the Northern Alliance along with other US-aligned Afghan parties to meet in 
Bonn on November 27 to decide upon the makeup and structure of a new Afghan state. 
The result of these talks, the Bonn Agreement, would acknowledge in its own preamble 
that many key political and ethnic actors were not “adequately represented” at the 
talks.190 Featuring representatives from only four of Afghanistan’s main ethnic 
groupings191 and no Taliban whatsoever, Afghan civil society groups from both inside 
and outside the country immediately challenged the legitimacy of the Bonn process and 
held their own alternative forums in the city on the same day.192 Reminiscent of the 
numerous failed peace talks mediated by the UN between 1992 and 1994, UN special 
representative for Afghanistan Lakhdar Brahimi expressed concern as the Panjshiri Tajic 
faction of the Northern Alliance and Shura-i-Nizura (the two groups with the strongest 
military and ties to the US) dominated the talks. When the diplomatic dust settled in 
December 2001, Hamid Karazi, a politically moderate Pashtun tribal leader, was chosen 
as head of the interim administration, the Northern Alliance agreed to the deployment of 
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a limited international security force in Kabul, and a transition process was decided upon 
that would lead to the creation of a new constitution and election within thirty months.193  
 In compliance with Annex I of the Bonn Agreement, the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) was authorized to deploy to Kabul on December 20, 2001 by 
UNSC Resolution 1386. Authorized as a peace enforcement mission under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, ISAF was mandated to “assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the 
maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim 
Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure 
environment.” The power to take “all necessary measures” was granted to ISAF to fulfill 
this mandate and enforce the provisions of the Bonn Agreement.194 This included 
provisions requiring all armed groups in the country to come under the command of the 
Interim Authority, a new Afghan army be created, and the removal of all participants’ 
military units from Kabul and other areas where the UN-mandated international force 
was deployed.195  
 Most notably, however, Resolution 1386 permanently linked ISAF with the 
questionably legitimate Bonn Agreement, and thus the Interim Authority that would later 
become Afghanistan’s central government. By linking ISAF to Bonn, the mission’s 
impartiality and legitimacy was compromised from the onset. While certain provisions of 
the Bonn Agreement were intended to mitigate the fractious security situation, the 
Northern Alliance and other powerful political players took key steps to ensure they 
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would come out on top in the new central government. When the 2002 loya jirga196 that 
Bonn required was held to choose a new government (the Afghan Transitional 
Administration) that would run Afghanistan until the scheduled 2004 election, Hamid 
Karzai was, unsurprisingly, appointed president of the Administration and proceeded to 
grant key cabinet posts to powerful members of Shura-i-Nizar and the Northern 
Alliance.197  
 Immediately following the loya jirga, various factional leaders discontent with the 
post-Bonn division of power threatened peace even more acutely than the Taliban or al 
Qaeda did at the time.198 On several occasions, OEF (who, unlike ISAF, was able to 
operate outside of Kabul in 2002) was forced to play coercive mediator in several ‘green-
on-green’ disputes between warring ‘pro-Bonn’ factions.199 Beyond stoking tensions 
among pro-Bonn actors, the deliberate exclusion of Taliban and Haqqani leaders from the 
2002 loya jirga and Northern Alliance’s stranglehold on the new government made a 
return to civil war all but inevitable.  
 
Coercive Force against Limited Spoilers 
 In mid-2002 as the central government was taking shape, senior Taliban and 
Haqqani figures (including all former high-ranking ministers and cabinet members) met 
in Pakistan to agree upon a course of political reconciliation with the new Afghan 
state.200 The very fact that this meeting occurred indicates that in 2002, powerful pro-
                                                          
196
 A traditional loya Jirga is a grand assembly of notable Afghans, typically powerful tribal and military 
leaders 
197
 Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Current Issues,”11.  
198
 William J. Durch, Twenty-first-century peace operations,507. 
199
 William J. Durch, Twenty-first-century peace operations, 494. 
200
 Linschoten,“Separating,” 6. 
  
98 
 
Taliban elements had a genuine desire to make peace with the Afghan central 
government in exchange for some type of power-sharing and political inclusion. 
Misperceiving the Taliban as a spent force at the time, both the Afghan government 
(dominated at the time by the Northern Alliance, the Taliban’s ‘arch political enemy’) 
and the United States refused to grant the Taliban the assurances of immunity needed for 
negotiations to take place in Kabul.201 Further evidence of the Taliban’s willingness to 
negotiate a formal surrender immediately after the loya jirga is evident in Khairullah 
Khairkhwa’s capture and extradition to Guantanamo Bay in 2002. Formerly the Taliban’s 
interior minister and governor of Western Herat province, Khairkhwa was captured by 
US Special Forces operatives in Pakistan while allegedly seeking to negotiate the 
Taliban’s surrender and integration into the new Afghan government.202 
  These attempts to negotiate a settlement to the conflict point to the Taliban and 
Haqqani being limited, not total or greedy, spoilers immediately following the 2002 loya 
jirga. While steadfast US opposition to dialogue at the time means we may never know 
the feasibility of the settlement the Taliban sought to negotiate, it is safe to assume that 
the weakened and crumbling force (or at least its leadership) would have settled for some 
type of political inclusion or power-sharing arrangement with the new government. As 
ISAF remained constrained to Kabul through most of 2003, OEF focused its efforts on 
intensive combat operations against Taliban concentrations in southeast Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan via drones.203 Although quick victories in these operations convinced US 
commanders the Taliban had been decisively defeated military, it is this unprovoked 
military action that likely catalyzed the Taliban’s transformation from limited to total 
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spoiler. Rather than negotiate with the Taliban when they were willing to do so in 2002, 
and utilize inducement and socialization, the US created and enhanced the perception that 
pro-Taliban belligerents must fight for ‘all or nothing’ in the conflict. 
 
Failings 
 As discussed previously, OEF’s use of a coercive spoiler management strategy 
against a conciliatory Taliban was likely the driving force behind the Taliban’s 
transformation into what can for now be considered a total spoiler with immutable goals. 
Compounded with the exclusion of key political and ethnic actors from the Bonn 
Agreement, OEF and ISAF delegitimized themselves from the onset through their 
perceived unconditional support for Bonn and the resultant Afghan Central Government 
dominated by the Northern Alliance. When the Afghan Government, plagued by 
corruption and nepotism, grossly failed to legitimize itself in the eyes of its citizenry by 
failing to provide economic reconstruction and security to the population several years 
after its establishment, the legitimacy of OEF and ISAF also suffered.204 Solo efforts by 
the US and ISAF to develop Afghanistan economically with provincial reconstruction 
teams were ultimately offset by the central government’s almost total failure to 
consolidate its economic and political authority.  
 Without an avenue for political reconciliation and inclusion via a settlement, the 
Taliban and Haqqani transitioned from limited spoilers with presumably limited political 
goals into greedy spoilers whose perception of the relative ‘cost’ of war was lowered by 
the opportunity for launching an insurgency amongst a frustrated and disenfranchised 
Afghan populace. Dismissing failure (extermination) and reconciliation as unviable 
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options, the Taliban set out to lay the groundwork for their 2006 offensive by utilizing 
their limited manpower and resources to target Afghan officials, aid workers, and other 
soft targets while bribing or terrorizing the local population into supporting their cause.205 
Flush with cash from the drug trade,206 the Taliban took full advantage of the central 
government’s failure to provide economic reconstruction and security to the population, 
and began creating ‘shadow’ governments and governors in several provinces.207 This 
“semblance of an alternative government” filled the power vacuum created by the 
absence of justice and became a key recruiting tool for the Taliban who carried out a 
“primitive, justice on the spot system” consistent with their interpretation of Sharia 
law.208 While the population did not necessarily prefer Sharia law, it was preferable to the 
Karzai government’s “inability to provide the level of security and economic assistance 
the population expected.”209  
 Alongside the failure for the Central Government to legitimize both itself and its 
OEF and ISAF backers, negligible UN involvement further cast OEF and ISAF as an 
overtly partial force. While some of ISAF’s early failings were ameliorated by political 
cooperation with UNAMA, the miniscule UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, ISAF’s 
inability to venture outside of Kabul until late 2003 meant it could not adequately 
maintain security or facilitate the DDR of combatants outside of the city. Rather, OEF 
was the only peace enforcer capable of operating outside of Kabul at the time, but was 
almost exclusively hell-bent on destroying the Taliban and al Qaeda and generally 
unconcerned with ‘peacekeeping.’ Until 2002, the Bush Administration and US 
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Department of Defense publicly opposed ISAF’s expansion, concerned about a 
“peacekeeping force getting in their way, needing airlift support, or perhaps needing 
rescue.”210 Instead of delegating sensitive post-conflict roles requiring impartiality to the 
UN or even ISAF, OEF unsuccessfully attempted to play force guarantor, mediator, and 
DDR facilitator while relentlessly continuing to seek the annihilation of remaining 
Taliban and Haqqani elements. In essence, the lowest-risk/cost option for the Taliban 
post-2001 was to regroup and launch an insurgency in the absence of any viable avenues 
towards DDR or a ceasefire/settlement with their long-time enemy, the Northern 
Alliance.  
 Much of ISAF and OEF’s strategy in Afghanistan runs counter to the theory of 
peace enforcement success I outline. Rather than counterbalance military advantage 
between the Northern Alliance and largely depleted Taliban in the early months of the 
conflict, OEF used relentless coercive force against a retreating Taliban eager to reach a 
settlement with the new Northern Alliance controlled government. Had OEF been serious 
about its commitment to democratization and sustainable and lasting peace in 
Afghanistan, it would have sought to raise the relative benefits of peace by extending 
opportunities for political reconciliation to the Taliban leadership and thereafter provided 
the security guarantee necessary to establish a more diverse representative government in 
Kabul. ISAF’s initial mandate, to create a ‘neutral zone’ in Kabul for the establishment of 
such a government was a start, but the exclusion of the Taliban and other key political 
players from Bonn cast both OEF and ISAF as partial toward the Northern Alliance and 
Shura-i-Nizura. Without a settlement or ceasefire in place, attempts by OEF and ISAF to 
orchestrate DDR and ‘implement’ Bonn were futile. Illegitimate in their perceived 
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connection to the Karzai government and partial in their determination to destroy the 
Taliban, OEF and ISAF were unable to convince combatants seeking reintegration that 
they would not be themselves targeted in the process. Had UN peacekeepers been 
assigned the task of facilitating DDR and other important tasks such as governance 
reform and economic restoration, it is possible that a number of factional belligerents 
involved in the ongoing 2013 insurgency would have been disarmed and the Karzai 
government wouldn’t have failed so absolutely in its attempt to provide economic 
reconstruction and security.  
 
Intractable War 
 A counterargument can be made that because most Taliban were motivated by a 
radical Islamist ideology, their spoiling behavior was total, not limited or greedy, and 
thus required a strictly coercive peace enforcement strategy. This is simply not true, and 
evidence to the contrary exceeds that found in the Taliban’s attempts to negotiate a 
settlement in late 2002. Recent 2012 reports suggest that the vast majority of Islamist 
hardliners among the Taliban and their allies number at “less than 100 or so”211 with the 
majority interested in mineral wealth, controlling smuggling routes, opium, and territory 
according to US intelligence reports.212 In other words, despite the common 
misperception that the Taliban are a strictly radical Islamist force, most Taliban are 
motivated by ‘greed’ and thus theoretically greedy spoilers responsive to inducement or, 
at the very least, financial incentives for making peace.  
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 As OEF and ISAF transitioned from peace enforcement to counterinsurgency in 
2006 and 2007, potential avenues for a ceasefire or settlement with the Taliban continued 
to be deliberately erased. A critical facet of US President Obama’s post-2010 
counterinsurgency strategy entails the deliberate killing or capture of as many senior 
Taliban leaders as possible. While ‘cutting the head off the snake’ would make sense in 
an interstate war, this has only created a ‘crisis of control’ within the Taliban as younger, 
more radical leaders closely connected to jihad and less willing to negotiate or 
compromise with foreigners213have stepped in to take the place of the older generation 
who is struggling to maintain its authority over the insurgency and its various 
elements.214 The likelihood of the recently established Taliban office in Doha, Qatar 
making a negotiated settlement with the Afghan Government possible appears a pipe 
dream as President Obama’s targeted killing strategy further fractionalizes the Taliban 
and its many allies. At the time of writing, March 2013, Karzai government appears 
uninterested in peace even as ISAF and OEF prepare to withdraw from Afghanistan and 
hand over full security responsibility to the central government. 
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Chapter VI 
Conclusion and Implications 
 
 This thesis seeks to demonstrate that peace enforcement operations not only have 
a strong positive impact on the likelihood of civil war termination, but can also serve as a 
viable settlement implementation mechanism capable of resolving cooperation and 
coordination problems that prevent disarmament and stable power sharing in a conflict’s 
aftermath. Using Cox proportional hazards models, I found a strong relationship between 
conflict duration, and the presence of contemporary peace enforcement operations 
utilizing the appropriate typological spoiler management strategy and cooperating with 
UN peacekeepers. Controlling for enforcement mission strength, this relationship remains 
nearly as strong, suggesting that my overarching causal theory is valid at the macro-level. 
When compared to traditional third party interventions, peace enforcement operations are 
significantly more effective at catalyzing civil war termination, although not in a 
statistically significant manner.  
 On a more micro level, I demonstrated through my two case studies the 
instrumental role peace enforcement operations can play in crafting peace when they 
utilize the appropriate spoiler management strategy, and maintain impartiality and 
legitimacy through close cooperation with UN peacekeepers. In the absence of these 
operational elements, such as in Afghanistan, peace enforcement can exacerbates rather 
than mitigates belligerents’ perception that they must fight for ‘all or nothing’ in a 
conflict. In Sierra Leone, Operation Palliser demonstrated the validity of my causal 
theory of peace enforcement success most clearly. The three key causal mechanisms 
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through which Palliser and UNAMSIL motivated belligerents to (a) genuinely agree to a 
ceasefire and negotiated settlement and (b) demobilize and abide by the terms of that 
settlement were by (1) counterbalancing belligerent military advantage and raising the 
cost of war and/or relative benefits of peace; (2) enforcing the settlement’s terms by 
making reneging more costly and providing the security guarantee necessary to prevent 
belligerents from taking advantage of their opponent’s compliance; and (3) establishing 
momentum in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of belligerents 
so that the transition to UNAMSIL’s follow-on peacekeeping operation could occur 
seamlessly.   
 Because my case studies do not perfectly follow Mill’s method of agreement and 
difference, future research is necessary to further test my causal theory of peace 
enforcement success. At the very least, however, this plausibility probe does indeed 
demonstrate that there is an important connection between modern peace enforcement, 
and both civil war termination and durable peace.  
 Several policy recommendations inevitably follow from this thesis. First, peace 
enforcement operations must conduct military operations in a manner that is consistent 
with impartiality via Stedman’s typological theory of spoiler management. Second, 
enforcement operations must cooperate closely with UN peacekeepers and delegate 
sensitive post-conflict stabilizations tasks such as DDR and statebuilding to UN 
personnel perceived as more neutral than conventional military forces. In terms of an 
amenable division of labor between enforcement operations and UN peacekeepers, peace 
enforcers should continue to provide the force capability UN peacekeepers lack rather 
than attempt to play the role of both peace enforcer and peacekeeper in the aftermath of a 
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conflict. Through recognizing the utility of the division of labor I outline and the 
effectiveness of Stedman’s spoiler management strategy, policymakers and practitioner 
can maximize the effectiveness of peace enforcement operations while working to prefect 
peace operations doctrine and best practices for future missions.  
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Appendix I 
Questions for Structured-Focused Comparisons  
 
A) Conflict Variables:  
• What were the factors driving the conflict and motivating belligerents (ethnic, 
political, secessionist, etc.)? 
• How many actors were there, and what were their strategic aims and political 
goals? 
• What type of leadership structure did each of the belligerents have (both 
government and rebels)? 
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• Were any of the belligerents receiving support from international or regional 
states?  
• Were there any previous ceasefires/settlements in the conflict, how long did they 
last, and which actors (if any) agreed to them? 
• Which actors (if any) spoiled or otherwise reneged on those 
ceasefires/settlements?  
• What was the state of the conflict immediately prior to the beginning of peace 
enforcement?  
• Did regional actors support the peace process/peace enforcement or continue to 
support opposing belligerents?  
• Was there a UN peacekeeping or other foreign military presence before, during,  
and/or after peace enforcement?  
• Did the nature of the conflict change over time?  
• Was there a stalemate?  
• How long had the conflict endured? 
• How many battle deaths had there been, how many people had been killed 
overall, and how many people had been internally displaced or made refugees by 
the conflict? 
• How damaged was the countries’ infrastructure before the operation? 
• Were there any easily extractable valuable commodities in the conflict zone 
(diamonds, oil, etc.)? 
 
B) Operational Variables: 
• At what point in the conflict did peace enforcement commence (during a 
stalemate, shortly after a peace agreement, etc.)? 
• What politically catalyzed the peace enforcement operation? 
• Was the operation explicitly or tacitly UN authorized? 
• Which actors were involved in the peace enforcement operation(s), with what 
motives, strategy, and force capability? 
• Were the actors involved neighboring states, regional powers, or former colonial 
rulers? 
• Were the actors unified by an organization or ad hoc coalition?  
• Did UN peacekeepers fight alongside peace enforcers or play a more passive role? 
• Was the operation deployed with the consent of the host nation and/or the rebels? 
• Was the peace enforcement operation strictly composed of military elements or 
did it also include multidimensional elements (state building, economic 
reconstruction, etc.)? 
• Were there any noteworthy incidents of civilian casualties or other negative 
events/accidents associated with the operation?  
• Did the enforcement operation commence with impartiality or with clear 
preference for one belligerent over another? 
• How many fatalities did the operation incur?  
• Was there a mutually hurting stalemate at any point during the operation? 
• Did the peace enforcement operation stay in the country beyond the end of 
hostilities to enforce a settlement/ceasefire or oversee DDR? 
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C) Outcomes: 
• Did major fighting occur between the enforcement operation and 
rebels/government?  
• How long after the enforcement operation was deployed was a ceasefire or 
settlement achieved, if at all? 
• Did the settlement last in the short and/or long term? What was the nature of and 
reasons for the breakdown (if one occurred)? 
• What were the terms of the settlement? Did they have any impact on the 
settlement’s preservation or disintegration, and which actors signed on to the 
settlement? 
• How long after a settlement or ceasefire was in place did the peace enforcement 
contingent depart? 
• Was a UN peacekeeping force present after peace enforcement’s conclusion? 
What was the mandate and strength of this force (if there was one)? 
• Did the humanitarian situation improve? 
• Are there any after-action reports on the intervention? If so, what were their 
conclusions?  
• Did peace last in the long term?  
• Did democratization occur in the long or short term?  
• How quickly did economic and institutional reconstruction occur?  
• Were there any incidents after major hostilities ceased or during the DDR 
process? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
117 
 
Appendix II 
R Notes 
  
Table 3.1 Model 1 CoxPH 
> mod1 = coxph(Surv(start,stop,censored)~modernpe) 
> summary(mod1) 
Call: 
coxph(formula = Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ modernpe) 
 
  n= 12558, number of events= 134  
 
           coef exp(coef) se(coef)    z Pr(>|z|) 
modernpe 0.5601    1.7509   0.3478 1.61    0.107 
 
         exp(coef) exp(-coef) lower .95 upper .95 
modernpe     1.751     0.5711    0.8855     3.462 
 
Concordance= 0.511  (se = 0.01 ) 
Rsquare= 0   (max possible= 0.083 ) 
Likelihood ratio test= 2.22  on 1 df,   p=0.1359 
Wald test            = 2.59  on 1 df,   p=0.1073 
Score (logrank) test = 2.66  on 1 df,   p=0.1028 
 
 
Table 3.1 Model 2 CoxPH 
> mod1 = coxph(Surv(start,stop,censored)~modernpe) 
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> summary(mod1) 
Call: 
coxph(formula = Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ modernpe) 
 
  n= 5582, number of events= 61  
 
            coef exp(coef) se(coef)     z Pr(>|z|) 
modernpe 0.5414    1.7184   0.3674 1.473    0.141 
 
          exp(coef) exp(-coef) lower .95 upper .95 
modernpe     1.718     0.5819    0.8363     3.531 
 
Concordance= 0.525  (se = 0.021 ) 
Rsquare= 0   (max possible= 0.069 ) 
Likelihood ratio test= 1.92  on 1 df,   p=0.1654 
Wald test            = 2.17  on 1 df,   p=0.1406 
Score (logrank) test = 2.22  on 1 df,   p=0.136 
 Table 3.2 Model 1 CoxPH 
> mod1 = coxph(Surv(start,stop,censored)~modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop) 
> summary(mod1) 
Call: 
coxph(formula = Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop) 
 
  n= 12558, number of events= 134  
 
                                  coef exp(coef) se(coef)     z Pr(>|z|)   
modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop 0.9542    2.5965   0.3950 2.416   0.0157 * 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
                              exp(coef) exp(-coef) lower .95 upper .95 
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modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop     2.596     0.3851     1.197     5.631 
 
Concordance= 0.513  (se = 0.007 ) 
Rsquare= 0   (max possible= 0.083 ) 
Likelihood ratio test= 4.51  on 1 df,   p=0.03362 
Wald test            = 5.84  on 1 df,   p=0.01571 
Score (logrank) test = 6.28  on 1 df,   p=0.0122 
 
Table 3.2 Model 2 CoxPH 
> mod1 = 
coxph(Surv(start,stop,censored)~modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop+ideology+religion+ethnic+lowint) 
Warning message: 
In coxph(Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop +  : 
  X matrix deemed to be singular; variable 3 
> summary(mod1) 
Call: 
coxph(formula = Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop +  
    ideology + religion + ethnic + lowint) 
 
  n= 12558, number of events= 134  
 
                                 coef exp(coef) se(coef)      z Pr(>|z|)    
ideology                      -0.2343    0.7911   0.2315 -1.012  0.31157    
religion                      -0.9427    0.3896   0.3555 -2.652  0.00800 ** 
ethnic                             NA        NA   0.0000     NA       NA    
lowint                        -0.3193    0.7266   0.2003 -1.594  0.11090    
modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop  1.0905    2.9758   0.4060  2.686  0.00723 ** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
                              exp(coef) exp(-coef) lower .95 upper .95 
ideology                         0.7911      1.264    0.5025     1.245 
religion                         0.3896      2.567    0.1941     0.782 
ethnic                               NA         NA        NA        NA 
lowint                           0.7266      1.376    0.4907     1.076 
modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop    2.9758      0.336    1.3428     6.595 
 
Concordance= 0.579  (se = 0.027 ) 
Rsquare= 0.001   (max possible= 0.083 ) 
Likelihood ratio test= 14.85  on 4 df,   p=0.005033 
Wald test            = 14.89  on 4 df,   p=0.004944 
Score (logrank) test = 15.65  on 4 df,   p=0.00352 
 
Table 3.2 Model 3 CoxPH 
 
> mod1 = 
coxph(Surv(start,stop,censored)~modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop:regional+ideology+religion+ethnic+l
owint) 
Warning message: 
In coxph(Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop:regional +  : 
  X matrix deemed to be singular; variable 3 
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> summary(mod1) 
Call: 
coxph(formula = Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop:regional +  
    ideology + religion + ethnic + lowint) 
 
  n= 12558, number of events= 134  
 
                                          coef exp(coef) se(coef)      z Pr(>|z|)    
ideology                               -0.1958    0.8221   0.2315 -0.846  0.39760    
religion                               -0.9762    0.3768   0.3664 -2.664  0.00772 ** 
ethnic                                      NA        NA   0.0000     NA       NA    
lowint                                 -0.3216    0.7250   0.2017 -1.594  0.11089    
modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop:regional  1.1618    3.1956   0.7452  1.559  0.11901    
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
                                       exp(coef) exp(-coef) lower .95 upper .95 
ideology                                  0.8221     1.2163    0.5222    1.2942 
religion                                  0.3768     2.6543    0.1837    0.7726 
ethnic                                        NA         NA        NA        NA 
lowint                                    0.7250     1.3793    0.4882    1.0766 
modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop:regional    3.1956     0.3129    0.7417   13.7692 
 
Concordance= 0.571  (se = 0.027 ) 
Rsquare= 0.001   (max possible= 0.083 ) 
Likelihood ratio test= 11.12  on 4 df,   p=0.02525 
Wald test            = 9.91  on 4 df,   p=0.04189 
Score (logrank) test = 10.16  on 4 df,   p=0.03789 
 
Table 3.3 Model 1 CoxPH 
> mod1 = 
coxph(Surv(start,stop,censored)~modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop+ideology+religion+ethnic+lowint+st
rength0+strength1+strength2+strength3+strength4+airpower) 
Warning message: 
In coxph(Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop +  : 
  X matrix deemed to be singular; variable 3 9 
> summary(mod1) 
Call: 
coxph(formula = Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop +  
    ideology + religion + ethnic + lowint + strength0 + strength1 +  
    strength2 + strength3 + strength4 + airpower) 
 
  n= 12558, number of events= 134  
 
                                 coef exp(coef) se(coef)      z Pr(>|z|)    
ideology                      -0.1596    0.8525   0.2342 -0.682  0.49555    
religion                      -0.9148    0.4006   0.3557 -2.572  0.01012 *  
ethnic                             NA        NA   0.0000     NA       NA    
lowint                        -0.4578    0.6327   0.2071 -2.210  0.02711 *  
strength0                      0.6321    1.8815   0.4756  1.329  0.18383    
strength1                      0.1940    1.2141   0.8030  0.242  0.80910    
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strength2                      1.1206    3.0667   0.4874  2.299  0.02150 *  
strength3                      1.2502    3.4911   0.6381  1.959  0.05008 .  
strength4                          NA        NA   0.0000     NA       NA    
airpower                      -0.2137    0.8076   0.4569 -0.468  0.63998    
modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop  1.4311    4.1832   0.4974  2.877  0.00401 ** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
                              exp(coef) exp(-coef) lower .95 upper .95 
ideology                         0.8525     1.1730    0.5387    1.3491 
religion                         0.4006     2.4963    0.1995    0.8045 
ethnic                               NA         NA        NA        NA 
lowint                           0.6327     1.5805    0.4216    0.9495 
strength0                        1.8815     0.5315    0.7408    4.7787 
strength1                        1.2141     0.8237    0.2516    5.8583 
strength2                        3.0667     0.3261    1.1797    7.9717 
strength3                        3.4911     0.2864    0.9996   12.1935 
strength4                            NA         NA        NA        NA 
airpower                         0.8076     1.2382    0.3298    1.9774 
modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop    4.1832     0.2391    1.5780   11.0892 
 
Concordance= 0.588  (se = 0.028 ) 
Rsquare= 0.002   (max possible= 0.083 ) 
Likelihood ratio test= 23.28  on 9 df,   p=0.005589 
Wald test            = 23.02  on 9 df,   p=0.006151 
Score (logrank) test = 24.15  on 9 df,   p=0.004074 
 
Table 3.3 Model 2 CoxPH 
> mod1 = 
coxph(Surv(start,stop,censored)~modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop+ideology+religion+ethnic+lowint+st
rength0+strength1+strength2+strength3+strength4+airpower+western) 
Warning message: 
In coxph(Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop +  : 
  X matrix deemed to be singular; variable 3 9 
> summary(mod1) 
Call: 
coxph(formula = Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop +  
    ideology + religion + ethnic + lowint + strength0 + strength1 +  
    strength2 + strength3 + strength4 + airpower + western) 
 
  n= 12558, number of events= 134  
 
                                 coef exp(coef) se(coef)      z Pr(>|z|)    
ideology                      -0.1514    0.8595   0.2351 -0.644  0.51972    
religion                      -0.9602    0.3828   0.3596 -2.670  0.00758 ** 
ethnic                             NA        NA   0.0000     NA       NA    
lowint                        -0.4490    0.6383   0.2074 -2.165  0.03036 *  
strength0                      0.7492    2.1154   0.5259  1.425  0.15428    
strength1                      0.4306    1.5382   0.8420  0.511  0.60905    
strength2                      1.3272    3.7706   0.5240  2.533  0.01131 *  
strength3                      1.4849    4.4143   0.6736  2.204  0.02751 *  
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strength4                          NA        NA   0.0000     NA       NA    
airpower                       0.1865    1.2050   0.5675  0.329  0.74243    
western                       -0.6516    0.5212   0.5067 -1.286  0.19840    
modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop  1.5466    4.6957   0.5061  3.056  0.00224 ** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
                              exp(coef) exp(-coef) lower .95 upper .95 
ideology                         0.8595     1.1634    0.5422    1.3627 
religion                         0.3828     2.6123    0.1892    0.7746 
ethnic                               NA         NA        NA        NA 
lowint                           0.6383     1.5668    0.4251    0.9583 
strength0                        2.1154     0.4727    0.7546    5.9300 
strength1                        1.5382     0.6501    0.2953    8.0116 
strength2                        3.7706     0.2652    1.3502   10.5296 
strength3                        4.4143     0.2265    1.1788   16.5300 
strength4                            NA         NA        NA        NA 
airpower                         1.2050     0.8299    0.3962    3.6648 
western                          0.5212     1.9187    0.1931    1.4069 
modernpe:spoilstrategy:uncoop    4.6957     0.2130    1.7415   12.6613 
 
Concordance= 0.588  (se = 0.028 ) 
Rsquare= 0.002   (max possible= 0.083 ) 
Likelihood ratio test= 24.98  on 10 df,   p=0.005376 
Wald test            = 23.75  on 10 df,   p=0.00829 
Score (logrank) test = 25.04  on 10 df,   p=0.005273 
 
 
Table 3.4 Model 1 CoxPH 
> mod1 = coxph(Surv(start,stop,censored)~spoilstrategy+ideology+religion+ethnic+lowint) 
Warning message: 
In coxph(Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ spoilstrategy + ideology +  : 
  X matrix deemed to be singular; variable 4 
> summary(mod1) 
Call: 
coxph(formula = Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ spoilstrategy +  
    ideology + religion + ethnic + lowint) 
 
  n= 12558, number of events= 134  
 
                 coef exp(coef) se(coef)      z Pr(>|z|)   
spoilstrategy  0.7208    2.0560   0.3214  2.243   0.0249 * 
ideology      -0.1856    0.8306   0.2311 -0.803   0.4217   
religion      -0.8959    0.4082   0.3546 -2.526   0.0115 * 
ethnic             NA        NA   0.0000     NA       NA   
lowint        -0.2939    0.7454   0.2018 -1.456   0.1453   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
              exp(coef) exp(-coef) lower .95 upper .95 
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spoilstrategy    2.0560     0.4864    1.0952     3.860 
ideology         0.8306     1.2040    0.5281     1.306 
religion         0.4082     2.4495    0.2037     0.818 
ethnic               NA         NA        NA        NA 
lowint           0.7454     1.3416    0.5019     1.107 
 
Concordance= 0.582  (se = 0.027 ) 
Rsquare= 0.001   (max possible= 0.083 ) 
Likelihood ratio test= 13.51  on 4 df,   p=0.009023 
Wald test            = 13.29  on 4 df,   p=0.009956 
Score (logrank) test = 13.79  on 4 df,   p=0.007992 
 
 
 
Table 3.4 Model 2 CoxPH 
> mod1 = coxph(Surv(start,stop,censored)~factor(motives)+ideology+religion+ethnic+lowint) 
Warning message: 
In coxph(Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ factor(motives) + ideology +  : 
  X matrix deemed to be singular; variable 7 
> summary(mod1) 
Call: 
coxph(formula = Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ factor(motives) +  
    ideology + religion + ethnic + lowint) 
 
  n= 12558, number of events= 134  
 
                    coef exp(coef) se(coef)      z Pr(>|z|)   
factor(motives)1  0.5395    1.7151   0.3397  1.588   0.1123   
factor(motives)2 -0.5260    0.5909   0.3537 -1.487   0.1369   
factor(motives)3 -0.1434    0.8664   0.5226 -0.274   0.7838   
factor(motives)4  0.5257    1.6917   0.6047  0.869   0.3846   
ideology         -0.1536    0.8576   0.2359 -0.651   0.5149   
religion         -0.8550    0.4253   0.3564 -2.399   0.0165 * 
ethnic                NA        NA   0.0000     NA       NA   
lowint           -0.3023    0.7391   0.2046 -1.478   0.1395   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
                 exp(coef) exp(-coef) lower .95 upper .95 
factor(motives)1    1.7151     0.5831    0.8812    3.3378 
factor(motives)2    0.5909     1.6922    0.2955    1.1819 
factor(motives)3    0.8664     1.1542    0.3111    2.4132 
factor(motives)4    1.6917     0.5911    0.5172    5.5335 
ideology            0.8576     1.1660    0.5402    1.3616 
religion            0.4253     2.3513    0.2115    0.8552 
ethnic                  NA         NA        NA        NA 
lowint              0.7391     1.3530    0.4949    1.1037 
 
Concordance= 0.592  (se = 0.028 ) 
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Rsquare= 0.001   (max possible= 0.083 ) 
Likelihood ratio test= 15.33  on 7 df,   p=0.03205 
Wald test            = 14.25  on 7 df,   p=0.04693 
Score (logrank) test = 14.84  on 7 df,   p=0.03812 
 
 
Table 3.3 Model 3 CoxPH 
> mod1 = 
coxph(Surv(start,stop,censored)~spoilstrategy+ideology+religion+ethnic+lowint+opposing.interventio
ns) 
Warning message: 
In coxph(Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ spoilstrategy + ideology +  : 
  X matrix deemed to be singular; variable 4 
> summary(mod1) 
Call: 
coxph(formula = Surv(start, stop, censored) ~ spoilstrategy +  
    ideology + religion + ethnic + lowint + opposing.interventions) 
 
  n= 12558, number of events= 134  
 
                          coef exp(coef) se(coef)      z Pr(>|z|)   
spoilstrategy           0.7226    2.0598   0.3222  2.243   0.0249 * 
ideology               -0.1840    0.8320   0.2321 -0.793   0.4280   
religion               -0.8915    0.4100   0.3592 -2.482   0.0131 * 
ethnic                      NA        NA   0.0000     NA       NA   
lowint                 -0.2892    0.7489   0.2109 -1.371   0.1703   
opposing.interventions  0.0199    1.0201   0.2570  0.077   0.9383   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
                       exp(coef) exp(-coef) lower .95 upper .95 
spoilstrategy             2.0598     0.4855    1.0953     3.873 
ideology                  0.8320     1.2020    0.5279     1.311 
religion                  0.4100     2.4388    0.2028     0.829 
ethnic                        NA         NA        NA        NA 
lowint                    0.7489     1.3353    0.4954     1.132 
opposing.interventions    1.0201     0.9803    0.6165     1.688 
 
Concordance= 0.583  (se = 0.028 ) 
Rsquare= 0.001   (max possible= 0.083 ) 
Likelihood ratio test= 13.52  on 5 df,   p=0.01897 
Wald test            = 13.29  on 5 df,   p=0.02078 
Score (logrank) test = 13.8  on 5 df,   p=0.01693 
 
